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Abstract 
 
Since the Barcelona Conference (1995), the EMP represents an attempt of the EU to re-launch its 
global Mediterranean policy towards the twelve Mediterranean Partnership Countries (MPCs). Besides 
improving the limited results of the Mediterranean agreements concluded in the 1970s, the renewed 
effort is aimed at counterbalancing EU engagement in East European recovery and integration. The 
broad aims of the Barcelona Process are to promote political stability in this turbulent area, establish a 
free-trade area by 2010 and promote social and cultural interactions. These, in turn, imply a number of 
themes, common to all the agreements with MPCs: the institutionalisation of political dialogue and 
programmes for improving the respect for human rights and democracy; economic cooperation in a 
wide range of sectors; the definition of provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public 
procurement, competition rules, state aids and monopolies; and cooperation relating to social affairs 
and migration. 
 
The prime instruments for achieving these objectives are the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAAs) and a financial support programme (MEDA). The aims of this study are to 
provide a broad assessment of the EMAAs and to identify key issues for analysis relating to the 
EMAAs, with particular reference to the agricultural sector. Much research has been done on the 
impact of the EMAAs, by institutes participating in ENARPRI, as well as by other research networks 
(FEMISE and MDF) and individual institutes. This paper combines the insights of these studies with 
current economic and trade data related to the implementation of EMAAs and agriculture. 
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1. Rationale and scope of the study 
1.1 The Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
As a whole, the Mediterranean region is often referred to as a geographically homogeneous unit. 
Nevertheless, if such homogeneity exists from the geo-climatic point of view, the same cannot be said 
for the political, economic or social characteristics of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean 
Sea. From the political point of view, the area includes some countries that were founding members of 
the EU (France and Italy) and others that have been members for a good number of years (Greece, 
Spain and Portugal). Others are queuing up to join (Malta, Cyprus and Turkey), but, especially along 
the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, there are a number of highly diverse political 
situations, to say nothing of the political and military turmoil that has for many years disrupted parts of 
the Adriatic and the Middle East.  
This study deals with twelve Mediterranean countries that, in different ways, are involved in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) with the EU.1 Even when confining our attention to the so-called 
‘southern shore’ of the Mediterranean basin, from an economic perspective, the situation is still varied: 
while three outsiders (Israel, Cyprus and Malta) share relatively high per-capita income levels – 
comparable to EU incomes – the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) are in the middle- to low-
income bracket. Correspondingly, varied models of economic development are found: from countries 
opening frontiers to the world economic system, to others with marked protectionist tendencies. 
Since the Barcelona Conference (1995), the EMP represents an attempt of the EU to re-launch its 
global Mediterranean policy towards the twelve MPCs. Besides improving the limited results of the 
Mediterranean agreements concluded in the 1970s, the renewed effort is aimed at counterbalancing 
EU engagement in East European recovery and integration. The broad aims of the Barcelona Process 
are to promote political stability in this turbulent area, establish a free-trade area by 2010 and promote 
social and cultural interactions. These, in turn, imply a number of themes, common to all the 
agreements with MPCs: from institutionalisation of political dialogue and programmes for improving 
the respect for human rights and democracy, to economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors, to the 
definition of provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public procurement, competition 
rules, state aids and monopolies and to cooperation relating to social affairs and migration. 
The prime instruments for achieving these objectives are the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAAs) and a financial support programme (MEDA). Most of these agreements are 
effective or will become effective soon (pending ratification, the trade components of the agreements 
                                                   
* Crescenzo dell’Aquila is at the National Institute of Agricultural Economics (INEA) Trade and Marijke Kuiper 
works at the Development Division at the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI). This paper is a joint 
effort of these two authors. Senior authorship is not assigned. Wherever necessary, draft versions of chapter 3 
and 5 are due to Crescenzo dell’Aquila, draft versions of chapter 2, 4, 6 are due to Marijke Kuiper. Integration of 
all chapters, chapter 1 and chapter 7 are shared. 
1 The EMP gathers, besides EU members, three candidates to EU membership (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) and 
nine countries negotiating new EuroMed Association Agreements (Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, the Palestinian 
Authority, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Syria). 
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may become effective after signing). Given the wide coverage of themes, implementation of the 
agreements will have a considerable impact on the (economic) relations between the EU and MPCs. 
1.2 Aim and scope of the study 
The aims of this study are to provide a broad assessment of the EMAAs and to identify key issues for 
analysis relating to the EMAAs, with particular reference to the agricultural sector. Much research has 
been done on the impact of the EMAAs, by institutes participating in ENARPRI, as well as by other 
research networks (FEMISE and MDF) and individual institutes. This paper combines the insights of 
these studies with current economic and trade data related to the implementation of EMAAs and 
agriculture. 
The study is divided into two parts. The first part summarises information on the MPCs and the 
EMAAs agreements. It starts in section 2 with developing a theoretical framework for analysing 
preferential trade agreements, of which the EMAAs are an example. This framework serves as the 
backdrop for analysing different aspects of the EMAAs in the second part of the study. Section 3 
provides a short description of the main features of the MPCs, focusing on their economic 
characteristics. Section 4 describes the main characteristics of the trade flows of the MPCs, to both the 
EU and the rest of the world. Section 5 proceeds by outlining the main features of the EMAAs, with 
special attention to the agricultural provisions, which are a strongly contested part of the agreements.  
Together these sections provide a theoretical framework, the main features of the MPCs and their trade 
relations, and the main features of the EMAAs, paying explicit attention to the agricultural aspects of 
the agreements. These building blocks are combined in the second part of the paper, assessing the 
current state of the EMAAs and their impact. Section 6 applies the theoretical framework of section 2 
to the EMAAs, relying on the background information provided in sections 3 through 5, and on 
findings from other studies. Section 7 concludes the paper by summarising the main findings and 
identifying key issues for future research. 
2. Analytical framework for analysing preferential trade arrangements 
2.1 Introduction 
EMAAs between the EU and MPCs have been in place since 1995. These preferential trade 
arrangements are part of a global surge in regional trade agreements (RTAs) negotiated during the 
1990s. Whereas in 1990 the WTO had been notified of 40 RTAs, this number had increased to 191 by 
2000. Different reasons have been put forward for the recent surge in RTAs. One possible reason is 
disappointment with the multilateral trading system. Limited results obtained in the Uruguay round 
and the failure of the Seattle meeting are mentioned as causes for the increasing number of RTAs 
(Crawford & Laird, 2001).  
A more fundamental reason is put forward by Fratianni and Pattison (2001). They argue that 
coordination and cooperation are facilitated by having a dominant party willing to take the lead and 
bearing a large share of the costs (since it also captures a large share of the benefits). As a result of the 
economic growth in the second half of the last century, the US has lost its dominant position (its 
contribution to global GDP has reduced from 60% after WWII to less than 30% in 2000). The more 
even distribution of economic strength has complicated multilateral cooperation. The formation of 
RTAs, especially recent ones including industrialised high-income and developing countries, recreate 
a structure with a dominant party willing to take the lead. Such a structure could speed up the 
liberalisation process compared with multilateral negotiations.  
Irrespective of the causes of the increasing number of RTAs, they can be expected to stay around. This 
raises a discussion on the relation between RTAs, which are discriminatory by nature, and multilateral 
trade liberalisation based on the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle. The current discussion centres 
on the question whether RTAs are ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling stones’ for multilateral trade 
liberalisation. A short summary of arguments put forward for both positions is provided in the next 
section. The end conclusion is that the impact is indeterminate and depends, inter alia, on the way an 
RTA is shaped and functions.  
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The remainder of the section focuses in more detail on the potential costs and benefits of RTAs. The 
discussion provides a framework for analysing the establishment of an RTA, and its potential costs 
and benefits. This framework is used in section 6 for assessing the EMAAs. 
2.2 Preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalisation 
The recent wave in RTAs differs from RTAs established in the 1960s and 1970s. First, the 
environment in which the RTAs are established differs. The earlier RTAs were implemented at a time 
of inward-looking development policies, focusing on protecting domestic production from outside 
competition. The new wave of RTAs comes about at a time of outward-looking policies. During the 
time when the number of RTAs surged, WTO membership increased from 80 GATT partners in 1990 
to 140 WTO members by 2001. In addition to this increased effort at multilateral trade liberalisation, a 
large number of developing and transition economies implemented unilateral trade liberalisation. The 
new RTAs are therefore much more committed to boosting instead of hampering international trade. 
A second feature of the new RTAs is the acknowledgement that integration requires more than 
reducing tariffs and quotas in a limited number of commodities. The new RTAs have a much wider 
product coverage (although they are often still limited for agricultural products) and aim at a deeper 
level of liberalisation and harmonisation in the long run. 
A third feature of the new RTAs is the combination of high-income industrialised countries with 
developing countries (for example, NAFTA, EU agreements with Eastern European and 
Mediterranean countries). In addition, new RTAs tend not to be limited to direct neighbours but extend 
over the globe. As a result, most countries are members of several RTAs that differ in terms of their 
regulations. This leads to the situation described by Baghwati as “a spaghetti bowl – to capture the 
challenge of multiplying rules of origin and the maze of non-tariff barriers that now apply almost 
everywhere to specific commodities” (quoted in Crawford & Laird, 2001:193). 
Earlier empirical work on RTAs focused on two major effects: trade creation and trade diversion. 
Trade creation refers to the replacement of domestic production by imports of more efficient 
production from partner countries, increasing both domestic and general welfare. Trade diversion 
refers to replacing lower-cost imports from the rest of the world (still subjected to tariffs) by partner 
imports (no longer subjected to tariffs after the RTA has been established).  
Reflecting the deeper integration aimed at in the new wave of RTAs, the more recent discussion on 
RTAs has shifted from analysing the balance between trade creation and trade diversion, to the 
relationship between RTAs and multilateral liberalisation. Regarding the interaction between RTAs 
and the multilateral system, there are three main issues: 1) the impact of RTAs on external policies, 2) 
the dynamics of RTAs and 3) the impact of RTAs on the multilateral trade efforts.  
Theoretical models of RTA formation highlight the negative impact resulting from an increase in 
external tariffs. Membership of the WTO reduces the scope for increasing external tariffs when 
forming an RTA. In practice, however, this argument needs to be qualified. First of all, control of 
RTAs by the WTO is limited: while the WTO has been notified of 220 RTAs, no report has been 
adopted on any of them. In practice this means that all kinds of distortionary policies can be 
introduced through an RTA without being sanctioned (resulting in the current “spaghetti bowl” of 
trade barriers). Part of the problem with evaluating RTAs is the ambiguous description in Article 
XXIV of GATT on the coverage required by RTAs: “duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce… are eliminated on substantially all the trade between constituent territories” (Crawford & 
Laird, 2001:203). In most agreements, including the EMAAs, liberalisation of agriculture is limited, 
raising the issue whether these agreements cover “substantially all trade”.  
Second, WTO rules prohibit the increase of bound tariffs. Nevertheless many (developing) countries 
apply tariffs below their binding levels. This leaves room for raising tariffs for non-RTA members, 
while lowering them for RTA members, without violating WTO rules. In practice possibilities for 
raising external tariffs thus exist. This begs the question of whether or not the new wave of RTAs has 
indeed caused an increase in protectionism by RTA members. Empirical analysis of recently formed 
RTAs indicates that this is not the case. The surge in new RTAs was accompanied by ongoing 
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liberalisation. Indeed there seems to be an indication that a liberal trade policy is required for the 
formation of effective RTAs; highly protectionist countries will not liberalise trade even with their 
RTA partners (Foroutan, 1998). 
The dynamics of RTAs could in theory lead to ever-expanding RTAs until global free trade results. 
Formation of a few competing large trade blocs, however, could also frustrate the movement to global 
free trade. Whether the trend towards large RTAs stimulates or hampers global free trade remains an 
empirical issue. One trend however is that the least-developed countries are left out of the blocs that 
are being formed (Crawford & Laird, 2001). 
The last issue is the demand for resources by RTAs and multilateral trade negotiations. These 
resources are limited, even for high-income, industrialised countries. On the other hand, negotiation 
experience may be gained during RTA negotiations, and interest groups could be formed to share the 
burden of multilateral negotiations. In the end, the effect on the multilateral systems is therefore 
undetermined (Crawford & Laird, 2001). 
In conclusion it seems that RTAs will continue to exist and expand while the effect on the multilateral 
system remains indeterminate. For specific countries the choice between unilateral, multilateral or 
RTA liberalisation will depend on the costs and benefits of these three options. The remainder of this 
section will look at the costs and benefits of forming an RTA from a theoretical perspective. This 
framework will be applied to the EMAAs in section 6, using the information provided in sections 3 
through 5 on the general economic features of the MPCs, Mediterranean trade flows and the contents 
of the EMAAs. 
2.3 Costs and benefits of RTAs 
The driving force for regional trade agreements (RTAs) is usually political, not economic. Therefore 
this section starts with the political motivations for RTAs. Although political motives may be the 
reason for establishing an RTA, they will have economic effects. These effects may be positive, re-
enforcing the RTA, or they may be negative, thwarting the RTA. The second part of this section 
therefore provides a short overview of the types of economic effects RTAs may have.2 Theoretical 
analyses indicate the ambiguous economic effects of RTAs. Complete trade liberalisation increases 
welfare, but RTAs are a partial trade liberalisation. As with other second-best policies, the effects 
cannot be analytically determined. Empirical analyses of specific arrangements are therefore needed to 
establish the net effects. The last part of this section provides a short overview of empirical methods to 
estimate the economic impact of RTAs. 
2.3.1 Political objectives of RTAs 
RTAs may serve several political objectives: 1) security, 2) bargaining power, 3) cross-border 
projects, 4) policy lock-in, and 5) producer interests. 
An important objective of RTAs is intra-regional security. Empirical evidence suggests that a doubling 
of trade reduces the risk of conflict by 17% (World Bank, 2000:13). One mechanism is the 
intertwining of economies through trade, making war materially impossible. A second mechanism is 
the building of trust among members through trade negotiations, which extends to other fields of 
interaction. For example, security provided an important motive for establishing the European Union. 
Whether or not an RTA fosters security depends on the economic effects of the arrangements. 
Historical evidence (the American Civil war, Bangladesh breaking away from Pakistan) indicates that 
an unequal distribution of the costs and benefits may also increase tension, resulting in a break-up of 
the RTA or even contribute to war. This underscores the importance of assessing the economic effects 
of an RTA, even if the RTA is established on political grounds.  
RTAs can also contribute to extra-regional security. The underlying idea is that economic cooperation 
will make common action for security easier and a more credible threat. Examples of RTAs that serve 
                                                   
2 The discussion of political objectives and economic costs and benefits of RTAs is derived from World Bank 
(2000). 
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an extra-regional security objective are the South African Development Coordination Conference 
(directed against South Africa) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (directed against Iran and Iraq). 
European Union membership of Central and Eastern European countries is also motivated in part by 
the potential threat posed by the Russian Federation. There is not enough empirical evidence to 
evaluate the effects of regional trade agreements on extra-regional security. 
A more recent security objective of RTAs is to contribute to security through economic growth. This 
applies especially to the RTAs that involve north-south partnerships. The underlying hypothesis is that 
increasing economic prosperity will reduce social unrest, stabilise regimes and reduce the incidence of 
religiously inspired violence. In addition, the two major northern partners, the EU and US, have an 
interest in reducing illegal migration, which could be achieved by increased economic growth and 
employment in the southern partner countries.  
A second objective for establishing an RTA is to increase bargaining power. The establishment of an 
RTA may make small countries more visible and can increase the concessions they are able to offer, 
allowing them to cut better deals than would have been possible individually. OPEC is one example, 
and the EU, partly inspired by increasing bargaining power relative to the US, is another example. In 
practice, joint bargaining is made difficult by diverging interests among members, making defection 
an attractive option. A side-effect of an RTA is that it may reduce the bargaining power of countries 
versus the multinationals. A multinational may be indifferent with respect to the country it locates its 
business in, but once inside the RTA it’s products may be shipped throughout the RTA without 
restrictions. The members thus have an incentive to compete with each other in providing concessions 
to attract the multinational. This may result in more concessions than the individual countries would 
have been able to negotiate. 
A third objective for establishing an RTA is the execution of cross-border projects affecting shared 
resources such as rivers, fishing grounds or rail connections. In the case of cross-border projects it is 
more difficult to agree to an arrangement, since an arrangement needs to be self-enforcing. RTAs can 
assist cross-border projects by creating trust among partners through repeated interactions and 
providing a broader range of activities in which members interact. This allows for a trade-off between 
activities, which may also reduce compensatory payments, and it offers scope for retaliation that may 
aid the enforcement of project agreements. 
A fourth objective for establishing an RTA is policy lock-in. Especially in the case of drastic policy 
reforms it is important to commit to the reform, to assure producers that the reform will not be 
reversed, allowing them to make investments in line with the new policy. Trade policies could be 
locked-in by using the WTO, for example by binding tariffs. With respect to policy lock-in, RTAs 
therefore especially play a role for non-trade policies. Democracy, for example, is a condition for a 
number of RTAs (MERCOSUR, EMAA). The locking-in of policies only works if penalties for 
reversal are severe and are enforced. This amounts to all partners having a strong interest in the 
policies. 
The fifth aspect of RTAs is promoting producer interests. For producers, RTAs are often more 
attractive than unilateral, nonpreferential trade liberalisation. RTAs offer the advantage of increased 
market size while limiting the amount of international competition. Because of producer lobbying, 
RTAs may be politically feasible when nonpreferential trade liberalisation is not. 
2.3.2 Economic costs and benefits of RTAs 
RTAs can have a wide range of effects on participating economies, which can either be positive or 
negative. There are four effects on domestic economies: 1) economies of scale, 2) reduced monopoly 
power, 3) increased efficiency, and 4) government revenue. In addition there are a number of effects 
involving shifts between economies: 5) changes in terms of trade, 6) increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI), 7) trade creation, 8) trade diversion, 9) agglomeration and 10) knowledge flows. 
By abolishing tariffs among RTA members a larger market is created. Access to a larger market has a 
number of effects on the economies. If technologies display economies of scale, access to a larger 
market allows a reduction in production costs. Economies of scale may also generate monopolistic 
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power. When markets are integrated, more competition between previous monopolists occurs. The 
reduced monopoly power will generally lower prices and erode monopoly profit. Enlarged markets 
increase competition in general, which will stimulate the increased efficiency of firms. Generally, 
more than the abolishment of tariffs is needed to reap these benefits from increased competition. Other 
regulations, such as production standards, frontier ‘red tape’, and antidumping and countervailing 
duties may result in markets staying segmented after abolishing tariffs. Abolishment of non-tariff 
barriers is referred to as ‘deep integration’. Abolishing tariffs may stimulate competition, but it also 
entails a loss of government revenue. Where there is a lack of alternative income-generating sources, 
as is often the case for developing countries, this implies a need for devising new sources of tax-
income before engaging in an RTA. 
The increased competition on the larger market owing to an RTA also affects exporters from the rest 
of the world. In response to the increased competition they may reduce their price, thus improving the 
terms of trade of the countries that are part of the RTA. This implies a transfer from the exporters of 
the rest of the world to the purchasers in those countries belonging to the RTA. Another impact on the 
outside world is a possible increase in FDI into the RTA region. A larger market, and possibly lower 
marginal costs owing to increased competition, may favour investments in production in the region, as 
opposed to exporting products from the outside to the RTA. A possible increase in FDI is based on the 
preferential nature of the RTA. As opposed to the previously mentioned costs and benefits, increasing 
FDI cannot be obtained through unilateral, nonpreferential liberalisation. 
Two effects form the basis of much of the theoretical and empirical work on RTAs: trade creation and 
trade diversion. Trade creation refers to replacement of domestic production by imports of more 
efficient production from partner countries, increasing both domestic and general welfare. Trade 
diversion refers to replacing lower cost imports from the rest of the world (still subjected to tariffs) by 
partner imports (no longer subjected to tariffs after the RTA has been established). A prime example 
of trade diversion is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, which protects members’ 
agriculture from competition from the rest of the world. Trade diversion involves a transfer of tariff 
revenue to domestic consumers and exporters from partner countries. 
Abolishment of tariffs among RTA members may involve a relocation of production activities. The 
balance between centripetal forces (knowledge spill overs, labour market pooling and supply linkages) 
and centrifugal forces (congestion, pollution and competition for immobile factors) will determine the 
agglomeration of production activities after establishing the RTA. For the distribution of costs and 
benefits of the RTA, it matters a lot whether agglomeration occurs at the sector level, allowing each 
partner to obtain certain sectors, or for manufacturing as a whole. In the later case, some countries lose 
from the RTA when all industrial activities relocate to a country that has a head start in, for example, 
infrastructure. 
Finally, another effect of an RTA is a change in knowledge flows owing to changes in trade patterns. 
Where trade creation occurs, there will be an increase in knowledge flows. Where trade diversion 
occurs, there may be a decrease in knowledge flows, depending on the type of partner to which the 
trade flows are switching. 
2.3.3 Concluding remarks 
No general conclusions on the impact of an RTA can be derived. As the discussion above indicates, 
the impact depends on the contents of the agreement, the economic structure of the countries involved 
and on the trade flows. The following three sections focus on different topics that will affect the 
impact of the EMAAs. Section 3 discusses general economic features of the MPCs. Section 4 analyses 
current trade flows in general as well as trade between the EU and MPCs. Section 5 discusses the 
contents of the EMAAs. Together, these sections provide the background for assessing the impact of 
the EMAAs. Section 6 draws on this background, as well as other studies of the EMAAs, to assess 
whether or not the EMAAs are expected to achieve their aims. The analytical framework developed 
above serves as the structure of this discussion.  
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3. General features of the economy and agriculture of the Mediterranean partner 
countries 
3.1 Introduction 
From an economic perspective, the twelve Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs) involved in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are rather heterogeneous: while three outsiders (Israel, Cyprus and 
Malta) share relatively high per-capita income levels – comparable to EU incomes – the other MPCs 
are in the middle- to low-income bracket and can be better defined as developing countries (DCs). 
Varied models of economic development are also found, ranging from countries with policies 
accounting for the need to open up to the world economic system, to others with marked protectionist 
tendencies. 
Despite basic diversities among the productive and marketing systems, it is still possible to identify 
certain common elements across the MPCs, above all focusing on the bigger DCs among them. An 
important feature is their relatively high population growth, which makes a faster pace of economic 
growth urgent. Also the role played by the agricultural sector attracts attention, both in 
macroeconomic terms (employment level and contribution to GDP) and in terms of trading ties with 
the EU. 
Other relatively common features of the MPCs’ agriculture relates to the structure of agricultural 
production, which tends to be specialised in cereals, fruit and vegetables. This, to a certain extent, can 
be explained by the nature of the system of production and the geo-climatic conditions of the 
Mediterranean area. Other factors driving this specialisation are the opportunities and constraints 
stemming from the international context. 
The structure of many MPCs’ agricultural systems is highly polarised between large scale capitalist 
farming – predominantly involving public or foreign-owned companies – and the very fragmented 
pattern of small, family businesses, often run on the lines of self-sufficiency. As regards to 
environmental conditions and the utilisation of natural resources, the fragility of the ecosystems and 
strong pressure on scarce resources are common features of both market-oriented and more 
subsistence-oriented types of Mediterranean agriculture. A fourth common feature of the MPCs is a 
scarce and uneven provision of inputs, above all land and water, representing a serious limiting factor 
for the development of agriculture. Other important environmental factors to be considered are 
desertification and soil erosion, caused by damaging agricultural practices such as overgrazing, 
excessive rotation and the abandonment of traditional methods of agriculture. 
Alongside these structural problems, the MPCs pursued a set of highly controversial agricultural 
policies. These were applied mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, when a goal of self-sufficiency in food 
was pursued, along with general policies of ‘import substitution’ that did not foster long-term 
agricultural development. These policies, in addition to the growing urbanisation, ended up in many 
cases increasing, rather than decreasing, dependence on food imports.  
This section takes a closer look at the economic structure and policies in the MPCs. The following 
section provides a concise summary of the main economic characteristics of the MPCs. Section 3 takes 
a closer look at the interrelated reasons for disappointing growth rates. From Section 4 the focus shifts 
to agriculture and agricultural policies. 
3.2 Key economic characteristics 
MPCs are a very mixed group, principally made up of countries that can be classified as DCs with a 
medium- to low-average per capita income (Table 1 presents economic characteristics and Table 2 
shows the demographic data). Exceptions are Malta, Israel and Cyprus, categorised as high-income 
countries. As a whole, the Mediterranean developed countries emerged from colonialism or semi-
colonialism only during or after the Second World War (with the exception of Turkey). 
Demographically, these countries are still rather dynamic, with strong emigration flows towards 
Europe and the Persian Gulf. Characterised by imbalances at both the general and the sector levels, 
their economies are often the subject of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes with 
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organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as with the European Union within the 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). 
As regards to development strategies, albeit with notable differences, for many years the majority of 
the Mediterranean DCs pursued a policy of fast transformation centered on industrial growth and 
capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector. These policies have had a particularly damaging 
effect on the agricultural sector and we can still find some of their typical distortions, above all in trade 
and exchange-rate policies (DeRosa, 1997). All this acquires particular significance, when we consider 
the importance of agriculture, in terms of both employment and GDP, for the countries in question 
(Table 3). 
Table 1. Economic indicators of Mediterranean Partner Countries (2000) 
 GDP level 
 
GDP 
growth  
1990-2000 
GDP /capita 
 
Debt  
 
Population 
growth 
Annual inflation 
1990-99 
 ($ billion) (%) ($1000) (% of 
exports) 
(%) (%) 
Algeria  48.8  -2.4  1.6  112  1.5  19.0 
Cyprus  10.6  n.a.  14.1     n.a.  0.4  n.a. 
Egypt  78.4  6.2  1.2  107  1.9  9.1 
Israel  106.4  7.3  17.1     n.a.  2.1  10.6 
Jordan  7.9  7.0  1.6  130  3.1  3.2 
Lebanon  12.5 16.0  2.9     n.a.  1.3  24.0 
Malta  4.0  n.a.  10.2     n.a.  0.5  n.a. 
Morocco  39.3  4.3  1.4  124  1.6  3.2 
Syria   13.6  1.0  0.8  290  2.5  8.7 
Tunisia  23.6  6.7  2.5  112  1.1  4.7 
Turkey  204.7  3.1  3.1  196  1.5  77.9 
Palestinian      
Territories  4.1  n.a.  1.4     n.a. 
 
 4.3 
 
 n.a. 
Source: Calculations are based on data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002).  
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of the Mediterranean Partner Countries (1999) 
 Population  Labour force  Urban population Unemploymentb 
 total growtha density  total growtha    
 (mil) (%) (pop/km2) 
 
(mil) (%)  (%) (%) 
Algeria 30.5 2.2 12 10.6 4.0 59.6 26.4 
Cyprus 0.8 n.a. 82 0.4  56.3 3.0 
Egypt 62.4 1.9 58 26.0 2.9 45.0 11.3 
Israel 6.1 3.0 269 2.7 4.1 91.1 7.7 
Jordan 4.7 4.4 47 1.5 5.2 73.6 30.0 
Lebanon 4.3 1.8 391 1.1 3.1 89.3  
Malta 0.4 n.a. 1184 0.1  90.3 5.3 
Morocco 28.2 1.8 59 11.5 2.7 55.3 17.8 
Syria 15.7 2.8 77 5.1 4.0 54.0  
Tunisia 9.5 1.6 58 3.8 2.8 64.8 16.0 
Turkey 64.4 1.5 80 32.0 2.8 74.1 6.4 
Palestinian 
Territories 2.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Notes: a annual growth 1990-1999; b average percentage of the labour force (1994-1997). 
Sources: Calculations are based on World Bank and FAO data. 
From historical, economic, demographic and political perspectives, on the other hand, the profile of 
the more developed MPC is quite different. Here Israel plays the most important role, given that 
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Cyprus and Malta – both well on their way to full EU membership – have a rather limited economic 
size. Israel is not only the economic leader among the MPCs, but is also a special case on account of 
its isolation from its Arab neighbours. In Israel, the primary sector is fundamental to the country’s 
economic development, because of the close links between agriculture and rural development and the 
need for national security and self-sufficiency. 
During the 1990s, many MPCs were involved in efforts to stabilise, restructure and re-launch their 
economies by tackling the inheritance of past development strategies and the difficulties of linking to 
the international economy. Although a number of countries managed to achieve by no means 
negligible results with stabilisation policies – in particular as regards to inflation and reduction of 
public debt – economic growth was insufficient to absorb the labour force surplus. Moreover, the 
performance of many macroeconomic indicators such as savings and investment, prices, the balance of 
trade and external debt were either unsatisfactory or insufficient (ERF, 2000). As regards to inflation, 
the situation of Turkey is particularly worrying; since the year 2000 Turkey has suffered repeated 
financial crises, characterised by sharp increases in interest rates, stock market and banking system 
instability, flights of capital and a dramatic devaluation of the Turkish lira. 
Trade flows, traditionally characterised by significant imbalances (with the exception of Algeria) and a 
predominance of Turkey and Israel, recorded an increasing deficit, and consequently a growing 
economic dependence abroad. Although many MPCs showed signs of improvement in their balance of 
trade (Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, as well as Israel and Malta), export was not able to keep 
the pace with the considerable overall growth in world trade in the first half of the 1990s. This blow to 
expectations was similar to the situation in the 1970s, after the opening of the European Community 
markets to MPC industrial goods (ERF, 2000). 
Foreign debt, still very high, also throws a considerable shadow on the prospects of growth for many 
of the countries in the study. Some smaller economies (i.e. Syria and Jordan) are more exposed than 
others, but the debt/GNP ratio is also notable for Algeria and Turkey, larger Mediterranean DCs that 
have shown the most discouraging trends in both economic growth and the size of macroeconomic 
unbalances.  
The attempts of the Mediterranean DCs to move in the direction of a more open economy have been 
hampered by external economic factors, as well as domestic economic and policy contradictions, 
which have worsened public and foreign debt, making the financing of investment projects more 
expensive. On the other hand, the effects of the short-term stabilisation programmes have had adverse 
socio-economical effects, hampering the efforts of these countries to re-launch their economies. Many 
of the side effects of such programmes and certain adjustment measures contribute to a downward 
spiral of recession (cuts in public investment, increases in interest rates, job reductions and salary 
freezes in the public sector and reductions in food subsidies), which tends to discourage domestic and 
foreign investment. Also, the devaluation of national currencies often has stronger effects on the cost 
of imports, rather than on export competitiveness, and can lead to severe shortages of industrial inputs 
and the under-utilisation of machinery capacity (CIHEAM, 2001). 
3.3 Causes of lagging economic growth in MPCs 
A combination of relatively high population growth and extensive unemployment make economic 
growth a prime issue for MPCs. Nevertheless, the actual track record of the MPCs is rather 
disappointing, lagging behind the growth rates obtained by comparable countries in other parts of the 
world. Figure 1 sketches different, interconnected causes of the lagging economic growth in the 
MPCs, generalising about the different countries. Three main forces dragging economic growth are 
depicted in the first row of text blocks: non-trade income, high protection and extensive state 
interference in the economy.  
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Figure 1. Outline of causes of slow economic growth in MPCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A first factor dragging economic growth is the presence of non-trade income. Oil exports and 
remittances are important sources of foreign exchange for a number of countries. Such a source of 
foreign exchange distorts the economy (the ‘Dutch Disease’) by boosting domestic demand. The 
resulting appreciation of the exchange rate promotes investments in non-traded sectors of the 
economy, while reducing investments in the traded sector. The distorting role of oil-income is relevant 
in Egypt, Algeria and Syria (Riess et al., 2001). The ratio of remittances to the value of exports 
approaches one in Egypt and Jordan, underscoring the role of (temporary) migration in MPC 
economies (Nassar and Ghoneim, 2002:5).  
A second factor dragging economic growth is high protection owing to an inward-looking 
development strategy. High protection shelters domestic firms from international competition. This 
reduces incentives for efficiency improvements and investments in innovations. Combined with the 
focus on non-traded sectors induced by inflows of non-trade foreign exchange, this has resulted in a 
production structure that is not internationally competitive. 
A third factor dragging economic growth is the extended influence of the state on the economy. This 
government influence takes the shape of an over-staffed public sector and a dominant presence of state 
enterprises. The bloated character of public sector employment is apparent from the fact that its share 
in (non-military) employment is twice the global average and, accounts for close to one-fifth of 
employment in MPCs. The state also plays a significant role on the production side, for example 
accounting for 30% of GDP in Egypt and Tunisia, and close to 60% in Algeria. Public investments 
were close to 40% of the total investment, which is double the middle-income average. Booming oil 
revenues in the 1970s and 1980s provided a further stimulus to increasing public sector expenditures 
in oil exporting countries (Bulmer, 2000; Riess et al., 2001). 
High protection 
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non-traded sectors 
Slow economic growth 
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High protection and extensive government involvement in the economy has led to unprofitable state 
enterprises that are maintained with subsidies and soft loans. This puts a high pressure on state 
budgets, causing severe macroeconomic instability. This macroeconomic instability makes reforms 
both necessary and difficult. Tariff revenues comprise an important part of the government budgets. 
Countries with high import ratios from the EU will be faced with significant losses in income, 
necessitating a restructuring of their economies. 
3.4 MPC agriculture 
Although agriculture is an important sector across the MPCs, its role in the economy differs by 
country (Table 3). In occupational and social terms, the distinction between the developing and more 
advanced countries in the region is evident: in the former the proportion of people working in 
agriculture varies widely, from a maximum of 46% in Turkey to a minimum of 12% in Jordan, 
whereas in the more advanced countries this proportion is less than 10%. 
In terms of GDP, agriculture is a major sector, again mostly for the developing MPCs and contributes 
as much as 24% to GDP in Syria. Jordan seems to have a more particular economic structure; although 
agriculture contributes significantly to employment (supplying 12% of employment), its contribution 
in terms of share of GDP is limited to 3%.  
Table 3. The contribution of agriculture to GDP and employment in MPCs 
 Composition GDP (%) Agricultural labour force (% total 
labour force) 
 Agriculture Industry  Services 1990 1999 
Algeria   9  60  31  26 24 
Cyprus   6  25  70  14 9 
Egypt   17  34  49  40 33 
Israel   3  30  67  4 3 
Jordan   3  25  73  15 12 
Lebanon   12  22  66  7 4 
Malta   3  35  62  0 2 
Morocco   14  32  54  45 36 
Syria    24  30  46  32 28 
Tunisia   12  29  59  29 25 
Turkey   16  25  59  54 46 
Palestinian 
Territories 
 
 8  27  66 
 
n.a. n.a. 
Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002) and FAOSTAT. GDP data are for 2000. Exceptions are the 
contributions to GDP by sector for Malta and Cyprus (WDI data for 1993) and for Israel (2001 estimates are from 
the CIA World Factbook, CIA, 2002). 
 
Production composition varies considerably from country to country, but is polarised on cereals and 
fruit and vegetables, followed by other staple foodstuffs or typically Mediterranean products (meat, 
milk, potatoes, sugar, pulses, nuts, olives and olive oil). The importance of agricultural raw materials, 
such as tobacco, cotton and sugar beet, on the other hand, is more limited. The main producers are 
Turkey and Egypt, especially, but not exclusively, for staple foodstuffs; however, other countries – the 
Maghreb, Israel and Syria – are often important players for particular markets.  
Besides the fundamental climatic and geographic features of the Mediterranean area, the composition 
of production is affected by long-term trends in world prices and the relatively lower level of 
protection of some target markets for Mediterranean products (fruit and vegetables, olive oil). Products 
that are not strictly Mediterranean (cereals, meat and milk) maintain a high level of importance in the 
agricultural system, because of their role in providing subsistence to peasant farmers and also, in some 
cases, because of policy support and trade protection aimed at reducing dependence on imported food 
(INEA, 2002; DeRosa, 1997). 
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The main issues in MPC agriculture can be summarised under three headings: polarised production 
structure, production limitations and food security. There is a marked and growing polarisation 
between large-scale, capitalist company farming and small family holdings. Institutional factors, 
insufficient public intervention in the reform of land ownership and, for some MPCs, strong 
government support for agricultural exports have accentuated this duality. Large firms complain above 
all about the lack of adequate services, while small farmers suffer from the difficulties of extracting 
sufficient revenues by traditional farming. This is because of natural and technical restraints, obstacles 
to mechanisation and other structural limitations, but also price dynamics and the conditions of 
marketing channels (INEA, 2002). 
Environmental, climatic and technological limitations impose restrictions on the expansion of arable 
land and create problems for the sustainability of traditional agricultural methods and ecosystems. The 
lack of fertile land and water is an evident limitation to agricultural development, while the goal of 
increasing yields creates further problems, owing to the chemical inputs already used on a massive 
scale. Desertification, soil erosion and infertility are serious problems brought about by overgrazing, 
intensive crop rotation and the abandonment of traditional agricultural practices. Inefficient and 
insufficient consideration of soil characteristics are often a feature of the management of water 
resources and can lead to the soil becoming too saline or alkaline, as happens in Syria and Egypt, or to 
soil erosion, which is widespread in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and the Maghreb3 (Makhlouf et al. 1998; 
Lacirignola-Hamdy, 1995). 
The question of food security is still a crucial issue for several Mediterranean DCs. In many countries, 
domestic production, relatively neglected compared with the industrial and service sectors, is often 
insufficient to cope with the increased food consumption, fuelled by population growth, urbanisation, 
increasing incomes and diet changes. The availability of low-cost subsidised food exports from 
developed countries has indirectly contributed to these processes (INEA, 2002). 
3.5 MPC agricultural policies4 
The orientations and tools of agricultural policy also differ from country to country. The priorities of 
the more developed MPCs are strongly influenced by specific external restraints. In the case of Malta 
and Cyprus, the overriding objective is the harmonisation of those policies and regulations required as 
stepping stones to full EU membership. In the case of Israel, agricultural policy has been influenced 
since its foundation by the need to combine agricultural development with national security and self-
sufficiency in food production, given its hostile geopolitical environment. As regards to the 
Mediterranean DCs, agricultural policy decisions have been mainly oriented towards dealing with 
structural problems and related issues. In this context, the major priorities of agricultural policy are to 
improve the performance of the sector and the level of food security. These minor – but by no means 
negligible – objectives relate to improving linkages between vertical stages of agro-food systems 
(competitiveness, marketing, etc.), as well as environmental protection, and food quality and safety. 
Measures of producer support and market regulation evolve slowly within the context defined by 
adjustment programmes, WTO commitments and preferential deals with the EU. All imply, for 
Mediterranean DCs, a fundamental change in price policies, with the aim of restoring the market 
mechanism and improving its operation. Liberalisation and structural adjustment have important 
implications for agriculture. Oriented to both sustaining traditional agriculture and improving the 
performance of competitive sectors at international level, agricultural policy reform aims at opening 
domestic markets, reducing protection differentials among agriculture and other sectors, but also to 
reducing government support for production prices (and/or reducing consumer subsidies), while 
reducing input subsidies. 
Some countries have made considerable strides in this direction. Egypt above all, as well as the 
Maghreb countries, has modified its policies considerably in order to reduce protection in the 
                                                   
3 The Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. 
4 This section is based on INEA (2002). 
A FIRST ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
 13 
industrial sector and re-launch agriculture by improving market efficiency. The most important 
measures are the following: 
§ reform at the level of infrastructure, particularly for the collection and transfer of water resources, 
particularly in the Maghreb;  
§ promotion of privatisation, private investment and a more dynamic land market (in the Maghreb, 
Egypt and Jordan), though within the strict budget limitations allowed by stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes; 
§ significant interventions in agricultural development services and marketing coordination 
(especially all in the Maghreb). 
The effects of the reforms vary depending on the starting point of the country concerned and the level 
of social consensus, but the overall picture is still characterised by hefty government regulation of 
agricultural markets, through intervention on prices (consumer and producer subsidies), quantities 
(quotas) and tariffs. In fact, the reform process has been rather selective: government support and trade 
protection are still considered indispensable for certain products, while forms of policy intervention, 
aimed at either controlling food prices or extracting surplus from the agricultural sector, are still in 
place. Moreover, there are still cases where agriculture suffers from an overvaluation of real exchange 
rates and trade protection in the manufacturing sector. 
4. Trade flows in the Mediterranean region  
4.1 Introduction 
The establishment of a Mediterranean free-trade area is a junction in the development of the EuroMed 
Partnership, and also in the perspectives in which the EuroMed Association Agreements have been 
built. This section aims at describing the MPCs’ current trading context and their relationship with the 
EU.  
The first part looks at the general pattern of trade by the MPCs and the developments over time. It 
discusses trade balances, the openness of the MPC economies and the composition of trade. The EU is 
a main trading partner of the MPCs. Section 4.2 therefore looks at the composition of trade with the 
EU, trade flows between countries and the importance of the EU as a trading partner for individual 
MPCs. The Mediterranean free-trade area (FTA) implies free trade among the MPCs. Section 4.3 
therefore describes the composition of trade among MPCs, trade flows between individual MPCs and 
the importance of MPC trade for individual countries. 
The following three sections describe patterns over time and the geographical orientation of MPC 
trade. Section 4.5 takes a more detailed look at the composition of trade for individual countries, using 
an index of comparative advantage. Section 4.6 takes a closer look at the composition and destination 
of agricultural food trade-flows. Although composing a relatively small share of current trade, 
agricultural trade plays an important role in nearly all of the countries in the region, although for 
differing reasons (i.e. employment, export revenues, supplementing shortfalls in domestic production). 
Issues of competition between EU and MPC producers play an important role in negotiations on 
agriculture. Section 4.7 summarises the findings on the specialisation of products and regions, and 
similarities in EU and MPC trade. 
4.2 General trade patterns 
The trade balance of MPCs as a group is negative (see Table 4). Exceptions to this pattern are Syria 
and Algeria, both of which rely on the export of fuels. The levels of imports and exports differ 
considerably, reflecting the different sizes of the MPC economies. Changes in the export and import 
levels in the 1997-2001 period also display a diverse picture. About half the countries (Algeria, 
Morocco, Israel, Malta and Lebanon) have high export growth rates, in most cases matched by high 
import growth rates. Algeria and Lebanon are exceptions, having a low or even decreasing change in 
imports and indicating an improvement of trade balances. Other countries have relatively low export 
growth rates (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey) or even a decrease in exports in the case of Cyprus. 
These countries have low or decreasing import rates as well.  
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Table 4. Exports, imports and trade balance for the MPC countries 
 Exports Imports Trade balance 
 Value Change Value Change Value 
 (2000/2001, $1 bil.) (1997-2001, %) (2000/2001, $1 bil.) (1997-2001, %) (2000/2001, $1 bil.) 
Algeria 22.031 59 9.152 5 12.879 
Cyprus 0.386 -10 3.885 5 -3.500 
Egypt 4.165 7 12.756 -3 -8.591 
Israel 31.407 40 35.742 23 -4.335 
Jordan 1.433 11 4.442 16 -3.009 
Lebanon 0.802 25 6.759 -9 -5.957 
Malta 1.991 36 3.063 20 -1.072 
Morocco 7.432 59 11.533 46 -4.102 
Syria 4.634 n.a 3.815 n.a 0.819 
Tunisia 5.850 5 8.566 8 -2.716 
Turkey 29.410 12 47.774 -2 -18.365 
MPC 109.540 36 140.444 6 -30.904 
Note: for Syria, only data for 2000 were available. 
Sources: The calculations are by the Landbrouw Economisch Instituut (LEI), The Hague, based on data from the ITC and the 
WTO. 
 
Next to Algeria and Syria, Egypt also has a significant share of fuels in its exports. Manufactured 
goods and machines dominate the exports of Israel, Malta, Turkey and Tunisia, and play an important 
role in the exports of the other countries as well. Exports of food and live animals take a relatively 
large share of exports in Cyprus and Morocco; Algeria is the only country not exporting food or live 
animals (see Tables 5a and 5b for the composition of exports and imports by country).  
To put the developments into the perspective of the MPCs, Figure 2 presents the openness of MPC 
countries over time. The openness of MPC economies (measured as the share of exports and imports 
in GDP) is above the world average. There are, however, large differences between countries. 
Presenting data for different groups of MPCs reveals that trade levels for most of the years are lowest 
for the EU accession countries (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey). Their low trade levels and the increase of 
these at the end of the 1990s are because of Turkey. The high degree of openness of the Middle 
Eastern and North African countries is to a large extent due to the exports of fuels by Syria, Egypt and 
Algeria. Israel, furthermore, has relatively high trade levels, increasing the group average of the 
Middle Eastern countries. 
The exports of MPCs are dominated by fuel, because of the fuel exports by Algeria and Syria (see also 
Figure 3). The size of the two webs again shows the negative trade balances; except for fuels and 
miscellaneous manufactured goods (mostly clothing), imports exceed exports in all categories of trade. 
This also holds true for food and animal products, where imports are 50% higher than exports. 
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Figure 2. Share of exports and imports in GDP (World Bank, 2002)5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Composition of total trade by MPCs ($1 bil., ITC/WTO data for 2000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aggregate composition of trade for the MPCs as a group obscures the differences between the 
countries. Tables 5 and 6 present the composition of exports and imports by major categories. A 
number of countries specialise in a single category of exports, either fuel (Algeria, Syria and Egypt) or 
manufactured goods and machines (Israel, Malta and Turkey). Jordan and Tunisia have the major part 
of their exports in two categories (fuels and chemicals, manufactured goods and machines), while 
Lebanon and Morocco have the most diversified export pattern, divided over three categories (food 
and live animals, fuels and chemicals, manufactured goods and machines). 
                                                   
5 The data of the following countries were used: Cyprus, Malta and Turkey (EU accession countries); Israel, 
Jordan, Syria (Middle East); Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (North Africa). Data of individual countries 
are weighed by GDP to get group averages. For Cyprus and the world total no data were available for 2000, thus, 
these were set to be equal to their 1999 values. 
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The composition of imports shows a more similar pattern across the countries, with manufactured 
goods being the single largest category for all countries. The second largest type of imports is fuels 
and chemicals for most countries. The exceptions to this trend are Algeria and Egypt, for which food 
and animals are the second largest group of commodities.  
Table 5a. Composition of exports by country (%)  
 Food & live animals Crude materials Fuels & chemicals Manufactured goods & machines 
Algeria 0 0 99 1 
Cyprus 27 3 25 19 
Egypt 9 7 48 20 
Israel 2 2 14 72 
Jordan 10 18 26 22 
Lebanon 11 9 11 32 
Malta 3 0 5 89 
Morocco 21 9 16 17 
Syria 8 5 77 4 
Tunisia 4 2 23 21 
Turkey 11 2 5 53 
Note: the data may not sum to 100% since only the major categories are included. 
Sources: the calculations are by LEI, The Hague, based on data from the ITC and the WTO.  
 
Table 5b. Composition of imports by country (%)  
 Food & live animals Crude materials Fuels & chemicals Manufactured goods & machines 
Algeria 26 3 13 52 
Cyprus 8 1 21 42 
Egypt 22 7 17 39 
Israel 4 2 19 65 
Jordan 15 3 25 46 
Lebanon 13 3 28 39 
Malta 9 1 16 61 
Morocco 11 5 26 49 
Syria 13 6 17 51 
Tunisia 7 5 19 57 
Turkey 2 6 30 47 
Note: the data may not sum to 100% since only the major categories are included. 
Sources: the calculations are by LEI, The Hague, based on data from the ITC and the WTO 
4.3 Trade between the EU and the MPCs 
The first thing to note about the trade between the MPCs and the EU is the large difference in relative 
importance. Imports from the EU compose 44% of total imports into the MPCs, while exports to the 
EU are 48% of total MPC exports. The EU is thus a major trading partner for the MPCs. The opposite 
is not true: imports from the MPCs are 2% of total imports into the EU, while exports to the MPCs are 
3% of total exports.  
Figure 4 displays the composition of MPC trade with the EU. The overall pattern is similar to the total 
trade pattern of the MPCs, except for the limited import of fuels from the EU. Again imports exceed 
exports, except fuels and miscellaneous manufactured goods (mostly clothing). Imports are dominated 
by machines and manufactured goods. 
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Figure 4. Composition of trade with the EU ($1 bil., ITC/WTO data for 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aggregate analysis for the EU and the MPCs obscures the differences in trade flows for the 
different countries. Analysing export and import flows among individual countries reveals a limited 
number of major players (Tables 6a and 6b). For exports and imports the same EU countries appear: 
Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Among the MPC countries, Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey appear as major players for 
both imports and exports. In addition, Syria has a significant share of exports (due to its fuel exports), 
while Egypt and Lebanon take a significant share of imports from the EU. 
Table 6a. Main export flows from MPC to EU countries (% of exports from the MPCs to the EU) 
 Algeria Israel Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Total 
Belgium/Luxembourg 1.2 3.5    1.3 5.9 
France 5.4 1.4 4.6 1.9 2.9 3.5 19.7 
Germany 1.4 2.8   1.3 9.9 15.4 
Italy 8.2 1.5  2.7 2.5 4.3 19.2 
Netherlands 3.1 1.7    1.6 6.4 
Spain 4.3  1.8   1.8 7.8 
United Kingdom 1.2 2.5 1.3   4.0 9.0 
Total 24.6 13.3 7.7 4.7 6.7 26.4 83.4 
Notes: the most recent data (2000 or 2001) are used; only entries larger than 1% are included. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
 
Table 6b. Main import flows from the EU to MPC countries (% of imports from the EU to the MPCs) 
 Algeria Egypt Israel Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Turkey Total 
Belgium/Luxembourg   5.5    1.5 7.0 
France 3.3  1.8  4.3 3.5 3.5 16.4 
Germany 1.1 1.5 4.1   1.3 8.2 16.2 
Italy 1.3  2.7 1.1  2.5 5.4 12.9 
Netherlands   2.2    1.6 3.8 
Spain   1.1  1.8  1.6 4.5 
United Kingdom   4.2  1.1  3.0 8.2 
Total 5.7 1.5 21.5 1.1 7.1 7.3 24.9 69.0 
Notes: the most recent data (2000 or 2001) are used; only entries larger than 1% are included. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
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The number of entries in the two tables provides an indication of the geographical diversification of 
trade. Israel and Turkey take a large share of the exports (13.3 and 26.4%) and imports (21.5 and 
24.9%), while also trading with a large number of EU countries. Analysis of the underlying data 
indicates that besides having geographical diversification, Turkey and Israel also have a more 
diversified composition of their trade. There is a surprisingly strong trade link between Turkey and 
Germany (9.9% of exports and 8.2% of imports), despite the lack of historical ties. 
The EMAAs are expected to stimulate trade among the MPCs and the EU. Part of the impact of the 
EMAAs (such as the amount of trade diversion) depends on the current levels of trade among the 
MPCs and the EU. Table 7 presents the share of trade with the EU as a part of the total trade by MPCs 
in 1993 and 2000. Comparing these two points of data indicates a decreasing importance of the EU 
both for exports and imports. Moreover, decreases are stronger than increases. The only exception is 
Morocco, which shows a 12% increase in the share of EU exports as a part of total exports.  
Exports to the EU are double digit numbers for all countries. The major exception is Jordan, with only 
5% of its exports going to Europe. For Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Malta exports to the EU are less 
than 50% of their total exports. Imports from the EU are at least 30% of their imports, but around 50% 
for most countries.  
Table 7. Share of trade with the EU for MPC countries (% of total exports and imports) 
 Exports  Imports 
 1993a 2000 Trend  1993a 2000 Trend 
Algeria 70 63 - 61 57 - 
Cyprus 57 48 - 57 52 - 
Egypt 44 33 - 40 33 - 
Israel 31 27 - 51 43 - 
Jordan 6 5 - 33 35 + 
Lebanon 23 20 - 48 44 - 
Malta 75 34 - 73 60 - 
Morocco 63 75 + 57 58 + 
Syria n.a. 66 n.a n.a. 31 n.a. 
Tunisia 79 80 + 74 70 - 
Turkey 50 52 + 47 49 + 
MPC 52 50 - 54 49 - 
Notes: a the earliest points of data point differ for Egypt (1994), Jordan (1995) and Lebanon (1997). For Syria, only data for 
2000 are available. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
 
4.4 Trade among the MPCs 
The objective of the Barcelona process extends beyond establishing a bilateral free-trade area between 
the EU and MPCs. The eventual objective is to create a free-trade area in the whole EuroMed region, 
thus including free trade among MPCs. Trade among the MPCs is therefore analysed in a similar way 
as trade with the EU. 
The composition of trade among MPCs shows the same pattern as that of the EU, being dominated by 
fuels. The second largest group of commodities is manufactured goods. The trade flows between 
countries shows a different pattern, reflecting the political situation in the region (Table 8). Where 
exports from Turkey again display the same geographical diversification as that of the EU, exports 
from Israel are limited to Cyprus and Turkey.  
Exports to the MPCs are less important than exports to the EU, except for Jordan (Table 9). Where 
only 5% of its exports were destined for the EU, 21% is exported to other MPCs. MPCs also account 
for 19% of the exports by Lebanon and Syria. 
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Figure 5. Composition of trade among MPCs ($1 bil., ITC/WTO data for 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Trade flows among the MPCs (% of total intra-MPC trade in 2000) 
 Exporting countries     
Importing 
countries Algeria Israel Jordan Syria Turkey 
Total 
imports 
Algeria     5.9 5.9 
Cyprus  2.6  1.7 3.9 8.2 
Israel   1.2  9.8 11.0 
Jordan     1.6 1.6 
Lebanon    3.0 2.0 5.0 
Malta 1.4    1.1 2.4 
Morocco 2.7    1.1 3.7 
Syria     2.9 2.9 
Tunisia 1.2    2.5 3.7 
Turkey 20.9 6.8  7.6  35.3 
Egypt     5.8 5.8 
Total exports 26.1 9.4 1.2 12.2 36.5 85.4 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
Table 9. Share of exports to MPCs in total exports (%) 
 Export 
 1993a 2000 Trend 
Algeria 2 8 + 
Cyprus 13 16 + 
Egypt 13 11 - 
Israel 1 2 + 
Jordan 10 21 + 
Lebanon 19 19 0 
Malta 0 0 0 
Morocco 5 2 - 
Syria n.a. 19 n.a 
Tunisia 5 3 - 
Turkey 7 8 + 
MPC 4 6 + 
Notes: a the earliest points of data point differ for Egypt (1994), Jordan (1995) and Lebanon (1997). For Syria, only data for 
2000 are available. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
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4.5 Comparative advantages of MPCs 
In order to assess the products in which MPCs have a comparative advantage, the Balassa Index of 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) is calculated for the MPCs.6 Table 10 presents the aggregate 
categories in which individual countries have a comparative advantage, i.e. an RCA greater than one. 
The RCA gives an impression of the current position in the export markets. It is not a ‘clean’ indicator 
of comparative advantage in the sense that current export patterns are influenced by trade policies that 
may distort the trade pattern. 
Table 10. Revealed comparative advantage of MPC countries (2000) 
 
M
PC
 
A
lgeria 
C
yprus 
E
gypt 
Israel 
Jordan 
L
ebanon 
M
alta 
M
orocco 
Syria 
T
unisia 
Turkey 
Agricultural products   4.4 1.3  1.9 2.4  2.7 3.9 1.1 1.6 
Non-agricultural crude materials 1.1   3.2  9.0 3.5  4.3 9.6   
Chemicals   1.8  1.3 2.5 1.2  1.2  1.1  
Energy 2.8 11.7  4.8      3.1 1.3  
Machines and transport        1.7     
Manufactured goods 1.5   1.3 2.6  1.3     2.1 
Miscellaneous products 1.2  1.3   1.3 2.0 1.2 2.4  3.1 1.9 
Notes: the average of data for 2000/2001 is used; the highest RCA score is underlined for each country. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
 
All countries have at least one category in which they have at least a slight comparative advantage, but 
there are clear differences between the countries. Most countries have an above average export level in 
three or more categories. Algeria is the exception, specialising in energy exports. Despite having an 
advantage in multiple categories, one category stands out for most countries. These categories are used 
to group the countries as having an advantage in agricultural products (Cyprus), non-agricultural crude 
materials (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria), energy (Algeria and Egypt), machines and transport 
(Malta), manufactured goods (Israel and Turkey) and miscellaneous products (Tunisia). It should be 
noted that countries could have a comparative advantage in specific products (specific fruits or 
vegetables for example), but not for the category as a whole.  
Table 11 takes a more detailed look at the comparative advantage of the countries, by identifying the 
top-three commodities in terms of RCA (based on a three-digit classification). The entries indicate that 
commodities in which countries have a comparative advantage compared with world trade flows are 
not necessarily their largest trade flows.  
Algeria, Israel and Malta have a strong concentration of their exports, with three goods accounting for 
41%, 31% and 72% of exports, respectively. This reflects their concentration of exports as indicated in 
Tables 5a and 5b. In the case of Israel and Malta exports are even strongly concentrated in a single 
commodity (pearls/precious stones and transistors, respectively). 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have a strong comparative advantage in fertilizer exports, although for 
Morocco and Tunisia these are only a minor share of total exports. Although agricultural products 
account for a limited share of total exports, six countries have agricultural products in their top-three 
products with a comparative advantage: Cyprus (vegetables), Egypt (cotton and rice), Jordan 
(vegetables), Lebanon (tobacco), Morocco (crustaceans) and Syria (cotton and spices).  
                                                   
6 Balassa Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (Nagarajan, 1998:17): W
i
W
j
i
ji
j Xx
Xx
RCA
/
/
=
 where 
i
jx is the 
export of good i by country j, Xj is total export by country j, 
j
wx is the total world export of good i, and XW is the 
total world export. 
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Table 11. Top-three commodities and exports share by country (2000/2001) 
Country   Category RCA Share(%) over total export 
Algeria  342 - Liquefied propane, butane 73.3  10.4 
  343 - Natural gas 29.2  30.6 
  244 - Cork, natural, raw; waste 12.8  0.0 
    cumulated share: 41.0 
Cyprus  054 - Vegetables 22.9  8.2 
  122 - Tobacco, manufactured 21.9  5.6 
  661 - Lime, cement, constr. matl. 21.6  4.1 
    cumulated share: 17.9 
Egypt  263 - Cotton 48.1  4.5 
  325 - Coke, semi-coke, ret.carbn 37.8  1.5 
  042 - Rice 35.4  3.4 
    cumulated share: 9.4 
Israel  667 - Pearls, precious stones 28.9  30.9 
  277 - Natural abrasives, nes 17.5  0.3 
  272 - Fertilizers, crude 10.5  0.2 
    cumulated share: 31.4 
Jordan  272 - Fertilizers, crude 837.3  15.0 
  431 - Animal, veg.fats, oils, nes 44.2  2.4 
  054 - Vegetables 19.0  6.8 
    cumulated share: 24.2 
Lebanon  269 - Worn clothing, textl.artl 96.7  2.5 
  121 - Tobacco, unmanufactured 41.5  3.6 
  897 - Gold, silverware, jewl nes 26.5  9.3 
    cumulated share: 15.4 
Malta  776 - Transistors, valves, etc. 15.6  63.2 
  629 - Articles of rubber, nes 11.8  2.3 
  841 - Mens’/boys’ clothng,x-knit 10.6  6.2 
    cumulated share: 71.7 
Morocco  272 - Fertilizers, crude 292.8  5.2 
  244 - Cork, natural, raw; waste 93.4  0.3 
  036 - Crustaceans, molluscs etc. 35.6  8.5 
    cumulated share: 14.1 
Syria  263 - Cotton 167.2  15.6 
  272 - Fertilizers, crude 121.5  2.2 
  075 - Spices 68.0  2.3 
    cumulated share: 20.1 
Tunisia  272 - Fertilizers, crude 33.1  0.6 
  421 - Fixed veg. fat, oils, soft 25.4  3.7 
  841 – Mens’,boys’ clothng,x-knit 22.9  13.4 
    cumulated share: 17.7 
Turkey  845 - Othr. textile apparel, nes 8.9  8.1 
  842 – Women/girls’clthng,xknit 8.4  5.3 
  676 - Iron, stl. bar, shapes etc. 9.7  3.8 
    cumulated share 17.2 
Note: an average of data for 2000/2001 is used. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
 
4.6 Composition and destination of agricultural trade 
Agricultural trade plays an important role in nearly all of the countries in the region, although the 
reasons differ among countries. Turkey, Israel and Morocco are the main agricultural exporters of the 
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area, but agricultural exports make up a high proportion of total exports for many other countries. 
Nevertheless, there is a marked deficit in the aggregate agricultural trade balance for the twelve 
countries in the study ($7.5 billion in the two-year period of 1998-1999), and the last decade shows an 
increasing gap between exports and imports. Cereals and animal products (meat and cheese) show the 
most significant deficits, while there are only surpluses for fruit and vegetables, and for fish.  
As regards to trade with the EU, the situation is broadly similar, but in this case the deficit is declining. 
This suggests that in the last decade some of the major MPCs have improved the trading performance 
of their agricultural systems, despite the presence of notable export restrictions, such as quotas, on 
many agricultural products traditionally exported to the EU. Especially for the DCs in the region, the 
detected shortfalls confirm a dependence on a foreign food supply and an increasing influence of 
consumption patterns stemming from more developed countries. Food trade deficits have become a 
relevant restriction in the operation of stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, in particular for 
countries such as Algeria and Egypt (INEA, 2002). 
As Table 11 indicates, the majority of MPCs have a comparative advantage in at least one agricultural 
product. This may partly explain the reluctance of the EU to include agricultural concessions in the 
EMAAs. Tables 12a and 12b present a break-down of agricultural exports and imports by category 
and destination.  
Table12a. Value and destination of agricultural exports by MPCs (2000)  
 Export composition  Destination(% by category) 
 
 
($1 mil) 
(% of total 
agricultural 
exports) 
 
EU MPC 
OECD, 
non-EU Rest of world 
Vegetables and fruit 3567 43 58 4 12 26 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusc 1167 14 65 2 27 6 
Tobacco, tobacco manuf. 656 8 12 30 7 51 
Cereals, cereal preprtns. 587 7 28 14 31 26 
Crude animal, veg.materl. 451 5 71 5 16 8 
Misc.edible products etc. 368 4 16 14 13 57 
Fixed veg. fats and oils 320 4 22 11 4 63 
Sugar, sug.preptns, honey 319 4 59 9 12 19 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 246 3 24 13 19 44 
Live animals 120 1 4 2 3 91 
Beverages 115 1 51 8 8 33 
Dairy products, bird eggs 95 1 14 7 6 74 
Meat, meat preprtns. 69 1 55 5 11 29 
Cork and wood 55 1 64 3 1 32 
Oil seed, oleaginus fruit 55 1 65 7 12 16 
Animal, veg.fats, oils, nes 53 1 2 39 2 58 
Hides, skins, furskins, raw 41 0 26 9 7 59 
Animal feedstuff 31 0 27 38 4 31 
Animal oils and fats 5 0 42 12 37 8 
Notes: data for Egypt are missing for 2000, so data for 2001 are used instead. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
 
Vegetables and fruit are to a large extent the most important export product for the MPCs as a whole. 
This category includes products that are considered especially sensitive because of direct competition 
with production in southern EU member states in citrus products, tomatoes and olive oil. The break-
down by destination indicates that the EU is the most important destination for the top-two export 
products: vegetables and fruit, fish and crustaceans. Significant trade among the MPCs only occurs in 
tobacco and related products. Apart from cereals (31%) and fishery products (27%) non-EU, OECD 
countries (including the US) play a limited role as export destinations 
Table 12b shows that cereals are the single largest type of agricultural imported commodity, 
accounting for 28% of total agricultural imports. Most cereals are imported from the US. Distribution 
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across the other categories of imports is rather even. Compared with exports, the EU has to share its 
dominant position in imports with other OECD countries (mainly the US). Imports from other MPCs 
play only a minor role. The share of vegetables and fruit imported from MPCs, is the exception, but it 
represents less than 1% of total agricultural imports.  
Table 12b. Value and origin of the agricultural imports of MPCs (2000) 
Note: Data for Egypt are missing for 2000, so data for 2001 are used instead. 
Sources: the ITC and the WTO. 
Looking at agro-food trade balances by country reveals a diverse pattern. From 1998 to 1999, only 
four MPCs were net exporters (Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Israel); all the others were net-
importers. Particularly, Malta, Libya, Lebanon and Algeria depend heavily on EU imports as shown 
by their standardised deficits, going beyond the –80% figure (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. MPCs’ agro-food standardised trade balance with EU (1998-99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: dell’Aquila and Velazquez (2002). 
 
 Export composition  Origin (% by category) 
 
 
($1 bil.) 
(% of total 
agricultural 
imports 
 
EU MPC 
OECD, 
non-EU Rest of world 
Cereals, cereal preprtns. 4924 28 28 4 59 10 
Cork and wood 1362 8 43 0 4 53 
Tobacco, tobacco manuf. 1356 8 17 2 64 17 
Vegetables and fruit 1321 7 28 14 32 26 
Animal feedstuff 1121 6 19 3 35 42 
Dairy products, bird eggs 1022 6 66 1 27 6 
Fixed veg. fats and oils 1022 6 26 6 15 53 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 910 5 21 3 5 71 
Sugar, sgr.preptns, honey 865 5 60 3 6 31 
Oil seed, oleaginus fruit 737 4 14 1 37 48 
Misc.edible products etc. 677 4 67 9 23 2 
Meat, meat preptrns. 522 3 20 0 16 63 
Live animals 468 3 42 1 42 15 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusc 466 3 33 8 19 41 
Crude animal, veg.matl. 300 2 57 8 15 20 
Hides, skins, furskins, raw 228 1 54 1 22 23 
Beverages 175 1 81 1 7 11 
Animal, veg.fats, oils, nes 155 1 47 2 16 34 
Animal oils and fats 129 1 7 12 53 27 
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4.7 Specialisation and similarity in EU-MPC agricultural trade7 
Compared with EU imports from non-EU countries, MPC exports to the EU are specialised in fruit 
and vegetable products (whose relevance in many MPC countries is well known), followed by citrus 
fruit, dried fruit and processed vegetables. For certain products such as flowers and ornamental plants, 
dried fruit, oils and fats, there is a very close product/country link and therefore little competition 
between countries in those markets. On the other hand, several countries have a high degree of 
specialisation in fresh vegetables (Cyprus, Egypt and Morocco), citrus fruit (Cyprus, Israel and 
Morocco) and fishery products (Malta, Morocco and Libya). This implies more competition among 
MPCs for these products. Exports of the EU to the MPCs are specialised in fibre crops, cereals, live 
animals, oilseed products and dairy. 
Comparing the structure of exports by EU members and MPCs with the EU indicates the importance 
of fruit and vegetable products (both fresh and processed), fishery products and olive oil (INEA, 
2002). The countries competing with each other differ by product. For olive oil, only Tunisia appears 
to be in rivalry with EU members. In the category of preserved fruit, Turkey, Israel and Cyprus are 
competing. For fresh fruit the relevant set of countries changes to Israel and Tunisia, while for 
processed vegetables, Morocco, Turkey, Lebanon and Israel are important players.  
In summary, competition between the EU and MPCs is concentrated in Mediterranean products and 
mainly involves southern EU members. As already pointed out elsewhere, EU-MPC competition and 
its impact affects a limited number of regions of the EU Mediterranean countries, particularly, those 
where Mediterranean products account for over 40% of agricultural production values (García 
Alvarez-Coque, 1999). 
There appears to be a correlation between preferential agreements and Mediterranean trade flows, with 
MPCs’ export specialising in products that enjoy preferential access to EU markets: fresh vegetables, 
citrus, nuts, processed fruit and vegetables, oils and fats, and flowers. EU exports to MPCs specialise 
in fibre crops, cereals and live animals, oilseed products and dairy, which enjoy preferential access to 
MPC markets within EMAAs. A study of export similarity suggests that, over a gradual and partial 
liberalisation process, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal could face greater 
competition from MPC exports. MPC import complementarity with EU exports is stronger for imports 
from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and France, while it is lower for southern EU countries 
(Greece, Italy and Spain). 
5. Instruments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the treatment of 
agriculture8  
5.1 Introduction 
Since the Barcelona Conference (1995), the EMP represents the attempt of the EU to re-launch its 
global Mediterranean policy towards the twelve MPCs. Besides improving the limited results of the 
Mediterranean agreements concluded in the 1970s, the renewed effort is aimed at counterbalancing 
EU engagement on Eastern Europe recovery and integration. The broad aims of the Barcelona Process 
are to promote political stability in this turbulent area, establish a free-trade area by 2010, and promote 
social and cultural interactions. These, in turn, imply a number of themes, common to all the 
agreements with MPCs, including: institutionalisation of political dialogue and programmes for 
improving the respect for human rights and democracy; economic cooperation in a wide range of 
sectors; the definition of provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public procurement, 
competition rules, state aids and monopolies; and, cooperation relating to social affairs and migration. 
The main instruments to shape all these dimensions of cooperation are the EMAAs and a financial 
support programme (MEDA). 
The next section provides some background information on the EMP. Section 5.3 takes a closer look 
at the two main instruments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: EMAAs and MEDA. Section 5.4 
                                                   
7 This paragraph draws upon dell’Aquila and Velazquez, 2002. 
8 This chapter draws upon INEA (2002) and further updates. 
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looks at the treatment of agriculture in the EMAAs. While providing a broad picture of agricultural 
provisions, this section focuses especially on the policy tools involved in the definition of preferential 
treatments, providing a general overview of the current features of preferences agreed by the EU and 
the MPCs on agricultural trade. Section 5.5 concludes by summarising the state-of-play for some of 
the major MPCs.  
5.2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
The Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference, held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995, gave 
rise to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) between the EU and the twelve MPCs, re-launching 
the ‘global’ approach to Mediterranean policy begun by the Union back in the 1970s. 
The EMP identifies three major chapters of intervention: 
§ Political and security partnership, promoting mechanisms to establish a common area of peace 
and stability, by strengthening political dialogue and observance of basic principles, such as 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, the development of the rule of law and democracy in the 
political systems; 
§ Economic and financial partnership, promoting a Euro-Mediterranean area of shared prosperity, 
by building an FTA and strengthening economic and financial cooperation. Economic cooperation 
comprises a wide range of fields (the FTA, national and foreign investments, environment and 
natural resources, the role of women in development, agriculture, infrastructures and research) and 
states the need to boost the south-south dimension of cooperation in order to avoid the 
establishment of a ‘hub-and-spoke’ system of economic relationships in the area. Financial 
cooperation is meant to be strictly correlated to the construction of the Mediterranean FTA. The 
substantial increase in financial assistance, which must encourage the mobilisation of local 
economic operators, is to be managed consistently with the transition of beneficiaries to sound 
macroeconomic policies; and, 
§ Social, cultural and human affairs partnership, promoting a decentralised cooperation in several 
fields and providing for the involvement of the civil society in the areas of education and training, 
youth activities, mass media, health and migration management. Guidelines for cooperation are 
provided also for fighting illegal immigration, as well as drug trafficking, international crime and 
corruption. 
Although a detailed comparison between the old and new waves of the Mediterranean policy is beyond 
the purpose of this report,9 some similarities with the 1970s association or cooperation agreements are 
worth mentioning. First, in more general terms the rationale for a global dimension of the EU’s 
intervention in the area remains the need to boost economic development of MPCs and reduce the gap 
between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours, which is a prerequisite for political stability in the 
area. Further, the need to strengthen integration between the two regions is common to the previous 
and current streams of Mediterranean policy, although the Barcelona Process represents an ambitious 
attempt to deepen and widen the set of political, economic and social-cultural dimensions of regional 
integration. 
In the Barcelona Declaration, agriculture is accounted for as a sector involved in both the construction 
of the Mediterranean FTA and relevant for the purpose of economic cooperation. Under the first 
profile, the absence of a defined prospect for liberalisation must be stressed:  
…taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural 
policies allow and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotiations, 
trade in agricultural products will be progressively liberalised through reciprocal 
preferential access among the parties (EU, 1995, emphasis added). 
                                                   
9 Elements of the historical background on the previous seasons of EU Mediterranean policy are available in 
CIHEAM (2003) and INEA (2002). 
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As a result, at least as far as EU concessions are concerned, the solutions taken on agricultural trade 
have a similar structure to those adopted in the 1970s. A rather sceptical interpretation of the 
Barcelona Declaration is that there will be no liberalisation of agriculture, apart from commitments 
made within the GATT negotiations that cannot be withheld from most MPCs by the MFN principle. 
This interpretation seems to fit observed behaviour: there have been no significant new concessions by 
the EU for agricultural products in the EMAAs (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:402). This implies both 
contradictions among the policy tools implemented in the different sectors (sector asymmetry in 
liberalisation) and contradictions between the tools and objectives of the EMP (the development of 
MPC agricultural sector and reduction of migration) (INEA, 2002).  
5.3 Association agreements and financial cooperation 
The first main instrument of the EMP is the association agreement. With respect to these agreements 
there is a difference between the relations with the three EU member candidates (Cyprus, Malta and 
Turkey), which are defined on the basis of old association agreements, their further revisions and the 
state of the accession partnership each country has with the EU. With these three partners, trade 
commitments have been reciprocal since the 1970s, although asymmetrical in favour of the three 
MPCs. 
As regards to the other nine countries, the relationships are defined by new EMAAs or, should these 
not yet be in force (as in the case of Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Syria), by the 1970s cooperation 
agreements (Table 13). The EMAAs are almost completed – only the negotiations with Syria are still 
ongoing – and discipline the political, economic and social-cultural relations in a relatively standard 
way, stemming from the basic chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and pursuing the goal of creating 
a Mediterranean FTA. Further, the EMAAs’ trade commitments are reciprocal and the liberalisation 
process varies considerably depending on whether manufacturing, agriculture or services sectors are 
considered. 
Under the ambitious goal of creating a Mediterranean FTA by 2010,10 concessions on manufacturing 
goods provide for a well-defined, progressive tariff, dismantling over a time span of twelve to sixteen 
years. Agricultural trade is to be gradually liberalised, based on the traditional trade flows, through 
periodical revisions of agricultural protocols. Finally, as long as services are concerned, the 
commitment is to abide by the results of multilateral negotiation (GATS). 
The EMAAs’ reciprocity represents a significant step forward compared with the first generation of 
agreements that (apart from Israel) provided for unilateral concessions by the EU. As a good share of 
MPC manufacturing exports already have free access to EU markets through old cooperation 
agreements, the new industrial trade preferences are going to be of a quasi-unilateral kind, favouring 
exports from the EU. For agricultural products the liberalisation process, albeit gradual and partial, 
entails the new commitment by MPCs to introduce preferential measures favouring EU exports. 
The other cornerstone of the EMP is the new modality of managing financial cooperation, which is 
closely linked to the prospect of creating a Mediterranean FTA. It is based on an autonomous financial 
regime with a single budget for the whole Mediterranean area (MEDA).11 MEDA replaces the old 
five-year protocols stipulated with each country, entailing a considerable increase in the financial 
endowment provided by the EU (4.6 billion euros in 1995-1999, three times the former level), as well 
as relevant procedural changes and a notable enlargement of issues to be tackled. Some of the MEDA 
interventions are meant to support MPC agriculture to improve economic performance and openness 
to trade, as well as support rural development (i.e. technical assistance, training, product 
diversification, environmental and social protection measures). 
                                                   
10 The reference to the deadline of 2010 may be better understood as an expression of political will that should 
provide a common discipline to the contracting parties. As a matter of fact, trade protocols attached to EMAAs 
provide schedules for tariff cuts that are not consistent with such a time target. Because of the usually very long 
process of negotiation and ratification of the agreements, only the EMAA with Tunisia shows a calendar of 
liberalisation fully compatible with the end of the decade. 
11 EC Regulation No. 1488/96 and EC Regulation No. 2698/2000 (MEDA II). 
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Table 13. The state of Mediterranean agreements and trade negotiations 
Country Agreementsa State of negotiationsb 
Cyprus Association agreement towards CU (1973) 
+second phase CU (2002) + accession 
partnership (1998); 
Accession negotiations concluded; 
Malta Association agreement towards CU (1970) + 
accession partnership (1999); 
Accession negotiations concluded; 
Turkey Association agreement towards CU (1963) + 
CU (1996) + accession partnership (2001); 
Preliminary accession partnership; 
Tunisia EMAA towards FTA (1995); EMAA in force in 1998; new agricultural 
trade protocols in 2002; 
Morocco EMAA towards FTA (1996); EMAA in force in 2000; negotiations 
ongoing for new agricultural trade protocols; 
Israel EMAA towards FTA (1995); EMAA in force in 2000; negotiations 
ongoing for new agricultural trade protocols; 
Palestinian 
Authority 
 
Interim EMAA towards FTA (1997); Interim EMAA in force in 1997; 
Jordan EMAA towards FTA (1997); EMAA in force in 2002; 
Egypt EMAA towards FTA (2001) + cooperation 
agreement (1977); 
EMAA ratification pending; old cooperation 
agreement in place; interim agreement on 
trade probable; 
Lebanon EMAA towards FTA (2002) + Interim 
agreement on trade (2003) + cooperation 
agreement (1977); 
EMAA ratification pending; interim 
agreement on trade and an old cooperation 
agreement in place; 
Algeria EMAA towards FTA (2002) + cooperation 
agreement (1976); 
EMAA ratification pending; old cooperation 
agreement in place; 
Syria Cooperation agreement (1977) + EMAA 
towards FTA; 
EMAA negotiations since 1997;  
Notes: a EMAA = EuroMediterrean Association Agreement; FTA = Free Trade Area; CU = Customs Union; 
bAgreements considered ‘in force’ have fully completed the ratification procedure, even though some parts of the agreements may 
come into operation before this. 
Sources: European Commission and the European Council. 
 
The MEDA budget is divided into bilateral (the EU to a single MPC) and regional chapters.12 As far as 
bilateral chapters are concerned, funds accrue to an MPC based upon the level of implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes and reforms that support the transition to an open economy. Over 
the time span covered by MEDA I (1995-1999), about 86% of the commitment credits have been 
addressed to bilateral cooperation and are shared in a number of fields: structural adjustment (15%), 
economic transition support (30%), socio-economic balance support (29%), environment (6.8%) and 
rural development (4.5%). Actual MEDA payments, however, have been much lower than the 
commitments (26%), because of the length of the implementation period for some projects and the 
need to negotiate the controversies and cumbersome procedures for project approval and management. 
MEDA II makes available 5.35 billion euros over the period 2000-2006, while the programme is 
involved in the wider process restructuring of EU cooperation towards development (European 
Commission, 2001). 
5.4 Preferences in Mediterranean agricultural trade 
From various perspectives, agriculture should play an important role in the new wave of 
Mediterranean agreements. Both the crucial importance of the sector in the economic structure of 
many MPCs and the weight of agro-food in MPC trade with the EU, as well as the MPC’s remarkable 
potential absorption for EU agro-food surpluses, would suggest substantial static gains from increased 
openness. Instead, the importance of agriculture in EMAAs appears to stem much more from the 
                                                   
12 Cyprus, Malta and Israel have access to regional funding only, although specific bilateral funding is provided 
to the two EU candidates in pre-accession frameworks. 
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troublesome negotiations on agricultural protocols and from the length of the lists of exemptions and 
restrictions to liberalisation that can be derived from those protocols. 
Although the profile of agricultural trade preferences differs among countries and products, the 
common feature is still that of an ‘agricultural exception’ to liberalisation (CIHEAM, 2003; INEA, 
2002). Regarding the idea of a very gradual liberalisation on a reciprocal basis, as stated by the 
Barcelona Declaration, EMAAs lay down a succession of deadlines for the revision of current 
protocols on the basis of an examination of the current trade situation and the prospects for further 
openings (but no defined schedule for phasing out tariffs and nontariff barriers [NTBs] is provided 
for). 
Moves towards liberalisation for agricultural products are limited to improving, on the basis of 
traditional trade flows, the previous preferential regime. With Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, the prospect 
of joining the EU, however, depicts a clear pathway towards reciprocal liberalisation. ‘Traditional’ 
trade flows embody the effects of decades of strong protection of ‘sensitive’ products on the EU side 
and ‘strategic’ products on the MPC side,13 which provide a fairly reliable guideline on where 
liberalisation is likely to take place: the more sensitive/strategic the products are, the more limited are 
the concessions. 
Table 14. The main agricultural products/product groups involved in major EMAAs 
Country  Products involved: 
 EU trading preferences MPC trading preferences 
Tunisia 
 
Live animals (horses); meat (sheep, goat); animal 
products; flowers; fruit and vegetable products; citrus 
fruits; potatoes; olives; olive oil; processed fruit, 
vegetable and citrus products; wine; cereal residues. 
Live animals (bovines); beef; milk in 
powder; butter; cheeses; eggs; seed 
potatoes; potatoes; wheat; other cereals; 
seed oil; sugar; feedstuff. 
Morocco 
 
Live animals (horse, sheep, goat); horse meat; flowers; 
fruit and vegetable products; citrus fruits; potatoes; 
olives; processed fruit, vegetable and citrus products; 
olive oil; wine. 
Live animals (bovines); beef; milk in 
powder; butter; seed potatoes; wheat; 
barley; corn; oilseeds; seed oil; sugar. 
Israel 
 
Meat (turkey, goose); flowers; fruit and vegetable 
products; citrus fruits; potatoes; sweet corn; processed 
fruit, vegetable and citrus products; baby food; bakery 
products. 
Beef; milk in powder; butter; cheeses; 
flowers; seed potatoes; potatoes; fruit and 
vegetable products; wheat; barley; other 
cereals; seed oil; sugar; processed 
vegetable and fruit products; feedstuff. 
Egypta 
 
Flowers; fruit and vegetable products; citrus fruits; 
potatoes; spices; rice; processed fruit and vegetable 
products; cereal residues. 
Live animals (bovines); beef; milk in 
powder; butter; cheeses; fruit; seed 
potatoes; oilseeds; seed oil; feedstuff. 
Algeriaa 
 
Live animals (horse, sheep, goat); meat (horse, sheep, 
goat); fruit and vegetable products; citrus fruits; 
potatoes; olives; dates; olive oil; sunflower-seed oil; 
processed fruit, vegetable and citrus products; wine. 
Live animals (bovines); beef; milk in 
powder; seed potatoes; wheat; barley; 
seed oil. 
Notes: a Products listed in the new EMAA, which is not yet in force. 
Sources: EU Official Journal. 
 
MPC concessions in favour of the European Union are not going to be discussed here in detail. 
Nevertheless it must be mentioned that, at least in principle, a preferential treatment for EU 
agricultural exports is a brand new feature for the nine MPCs not involved in the next EU 
enlargement. Compared with European Union concessions, MPC preferences are more limited, both in 
                                                   
13 According to the Commission, ‘sensitive’ products on the Mediterranean scene are: tomatoes, olive oil, 
almonds, oranges, mandarins, lemons, grapes, melons, strawberries, flowers, potatoes, rice and wine (European 
Commission, 1997). The definition of ‘strategic’ products varies among MPCs, but the bulk of these products are 
made of staple foodstuffs (cereals, meat and dairy products). 
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terms of the share of preferential over total trade flows and in terms of tariff reductions. The products 
concerned are largely staple foodstuffs or ‘continental’ products (see Table 14). 
On the side of EU preferences, generally speaking the treatment within the six EMAAs whose 
agricultural protocols are already in force is comparable to the treatment granted to the three EU 
candidates (owing to the recent interim agreement with Lebanon, only with Egypt, Algeria and Syria 
are the trading relationships still based on 1970s cooperation agreements and further revisions). All 
these countries benefit from a rather wide coverage of traditional trade flows and, for these flows, a 
lowering of ad valorem tariff which now stands at 100% for nearly all products. Products involved are 
mainly ‘Mediterranean’ (fruit and vegetables, citrus fruits, olive oil, wine), although for some 
countries the range is wider. 
Table 15. EU agricultural preferences on entry prices of fruit and vegetable products (2001) 
Product/Country Calendar of the 
implementation of the 
preferential EP 
Preferential EP 
quota (tonnes)a 
Preferential EP 
(euro/tonnes) 
% Reduction on 
MFN EPb 
Tomatoes     
 Morocco 1 October-31 March, 
of which: 
150,676 461 15-45% 
  October 5,000 461 15% 
  November-Marchc 145,676 461 27-45% 
Courgettesd     
 Morocco 1-31 January 424 13% 
 1-20 April 424 38% 
 1 October-31 December 
5,600 
424 13% 
Artichokes     
 Morocco 1 Nov.-31 Dec. 500 571  39% 
Cucumbers     
 Morocco 1 November-31 May 5,000 449 11-58% 
Tangerines     
 Morocco 1 Nov.-end of Feb. 110,000 484 25% 
Oranges     
 Morocco 1 December -31 May 300,000 264 25% 
 Israel 1 December -31 May 200,000 264 25% 
 Cyprus 1 December -31 May 48,200 264 25% 
 Egypte 1 December -31 May 34,000 264 25% 
Notes: a Preferential EP quotas can differ from preferential tariff rate quotas. 
b When the MFN EP varies by sub-calendars, only minimum and maximum percentage reductions are reported. 
c From November to March a further monthly break-out of the EP quota exists, with the option of forward or 
backward loading of 20% to the stated amount. 
d The EP quota refers to a global time span of the three periods specified in the calendar. 
e Concessions are currently applied on the basis of 1970s agreements and further revisions. 
Source: INEA (2002). 
 
The economic relevance of tariff cuts, in terms of product coverage and preference margins, varies 
among MPCs. In the case of Tunisia, the coverage of traditional trade flows is above 90%; the same 
holds for Turkey, while for Morocco and Israel the product coverage is 88% and 71%, respectively 
(WTO, 2001; Tangermann, 1996). Tangermann, through a comparison with the pre-EMAAs 
agricultural protocols, showed an increase in the degree of product coverage in the cases of Morocco 
and Israel (about 20%), while a slight decrease would characterise Tunisian preferences (-2.6%) owing 
to a narrower definition of the quality of olive oil suitable for preferential export to the EU. The 
aggregate value of the preference margin moved accordingly, increasing to 77 and 47 billion ecus, 
respectively for Morocco and Israel, and slightly reducing to 33.6 billion ecus for Tunisia 
(Tangermann, 1996). 
Once we move to NTBs, the concessions on specific duties imposed on a number of fruit and 
vegetable products, as well as other Mediterranean products and some staple foodstuff products, are 
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much less incisive. In particular, for fruit and vegetables no preferential measures are foreseen 
regarding specific duties on a number of products subject to entry price,14 although there are some 
important concessions for certain countries on the level of some prices in question (Table 15). With 
reference to this, it has to be stressed that both the management of the entry price system emerging 
from the Uruguay Round and the concessions on some of these prices can determine a notable 
advantage for favoured exporters against rival contenders for EU market quotas (Cioffi-dell’Aquila, 
2003; Tangermann, 1996).15 
The effect of the reduction in tariffs and NTBs is reduced by numerous exceptions, on a seasonal 
and/or product basis, which, taken as a whole, render the current EU agricultural preferences very 
similar to those characterising the old 1970s agreements (INEA, 2002). Seasonal suspension of 
preferences resembles the seasonality of protection, restoring higher tariffs and entry prices for the 
majority of fresh fruit and vegetables in specific periods of the year, which is compatible with the 
harvesting within the EU. Other exceptions cover a very small number of fresh or processed fruit and 
vegetables, some tropical products and a certain number of minor products, whose tariff reduction is 
less than 100%. 
Furthermore, a variety of quantity restrictions of the preferential treatment indicate that the EU is still 
pursuing a combination of Mediterranean preference with the protection of domestic production, 
manipulating the concessions in order to avoid radical changes in consolidated trade flows. Tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) are currently imposed on imports of a large number of fresh fruit and vegetables and 
some dried or processed ones, as well as flowers, Tunisian olive oil and all qualities of wine. Usually 
TRQs restrict the preferential treatment; nevertheless, there are a number of cases in which the excess 
quantity itself enjoys a tariff reduction, though a lower one. In many instances, instead of TRQs, 
reference quantities (RQs), or the right to impose RQs, are defined, so that the Commission has the 
option to submit a product to a TRQ. RQs are imposed on many fresh fruit and vegetables, some dried 
or processed ones, nuts, and fresh and preserved tropical fruit (Table 16). 
The restrictions in question are relevant not only for domestic protection purposes, but also for both 
the distribution of the preference margin between importers and exporters and their forms of 
coordination. In the case of fruit and vegetable products, the wedge between preferential and MFN 
pricing is a preference margin that makes room for non-competitive behaviour among traders. Pricing 
at the lowest level (preferential entry price) implies that the margin is completely spent in order to 
increase the market share on the EU market, while higher prices allow some extra gain. The degree of 
exploitation of preferential quotas, the features of licensing systems (if any), as well as other factors 
affecting the concentration on both imports and exports, will affect the actual pricing and distribution 
of the preference margin between operators (Cioffi and dell’Aquila, 2003).16 
More generally, quotas, being defined on a product/country basis and coordinated with seasonal 
restraints, can be rather helpful in distributing EU market shares among preferential partners. Finally, 
another general reason for focusing the discussion on quantity restrictions is that there is little room 
left for further tariff concessions. Quantity restrictions thus define the major ground for further 
developments of Mediterranean agricultural trade liberalisation (INEA, 2002). 
 
                                                   
14 The system implies that a relevant surcharge (maximum tariff equivalent [MTE]), over the normal tariff, is 
applied on imports whose cost insurance and freight (CIF) price is below the entry price bound in the WTO 
schedule of the EU. 
15 The entry price system allows the preferred exporter to undercut the price of any MFN exporter, not incurring 
in the prohibitive MTE, because of the concession on the level of both tariff and entry price. 
16 If a licensing system is in place and the TRQ is actually binding, the ‘owner’ of the licence is likely to attract 
most of the preference margin, as he/she is in a quasi-monopolist position. Monopoly export agencies may 
determine similar results (Tangermann, 1996). Nevertheless, both the traditional licensing systems implemented 
by the EU (giving licences to trading companies registered in the EU) and the MPCs’ marketing boards have 
weakened or been dismantled in recent years. 
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Table 16. EU restrictions on the preferential treatment of agricultural exports from major MPCs by 
main products/product groups (January 2002) 
Country Tariff rate quotas (TRQ) Reference quantities (RQ) Potential RQ 
 product tonnes product tonnes product 
Turkey Preserved tomatoes   30,000 
 Watermelons   14,000 
 Prepared tomatoes     8,000 
 Onions     2,000 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tunisia Olive oil   50,000 Almonds   1,120 Tomatoes 
 Oranges   35,123 Apricots   2,240 Capers 
 Potatoes   16,800 Dried oranges   1,680 Garlic 
 Preserved tomatoes     4,000   Asparagus 
Morocco Oranges 380,800 Preserved apricots 1   7,560 Olives 
 Tomatoes 168,757 Preserved apricots 2   7,200 Capers 
 Mandarins and tangerines 168,000 Sweet peppers   3,360 Beans 
 Cucumber     5,600 Dried citrus   1,120 Peas 
Israel Cut flowers   19,500 Avocados 37,200 Grapefruits 
 Orange juice   92,600 Grapefruit juice 34,440 Dates 
 Oranges 
Mandarins 
200,000 
  21,000 
Grapefr. in segments 
Table grapes 
21,440 
  2,280 
Mangoes and trop. frt. 
Egypta New potatoes 130,000 
 Dried onions b16,000 
 String beans b15,000 
 Oranges   50,000 
           n.a.     n.a.             n.a. 
Notes: a TRQ to be applied following the implementation of the EMAA (first year of implementation). 
b TRQ gathering also on other vegetable products and pulses;  n.a. = not applicable. 
Source: INEA (2002). 
 
5.5 Agreements and agricultural negotiations with major MPCs 
The state of the negotiations and the way in which agriculture is dealt with differs by country. This 
section describes key features of the agreements with the major MPCs. 
5.5.1 Turkey 
This country only officially became a candidate for EU membership in the year 2000. The accession 
partnership was set up in 2001 but accession negotiations have not started yet. Turkey is still 
considered far from meeting the convergence criteria (Copenhagen criteria) and agriculture is one of 
the sectors where little progress has been achieved in aligning legislations (European Commission, 
2002). Trade relations with the EU can be seen in the context of the 1963 association agreement and 
later revisions, as well as the Customs Union (CU) that came into force in 1996. Drawing upon these 
legal bases, the Decision of the EU-Turkey Association Council of February 1998 set up the current 
reciprocal agricultural concessions (EC-Turkey Council, 1998). 
The preferential regime envisages widespread exemptions of ad valorem duties and preferential 
measures on specific duties for certain products, roughly covering 93% of traditional exports to the 
EU. For many products, tariff exemptions or reductions are to be bound by TRQs (sheep, goat and 
turkey meat, sheep cheese, fresh and processed fruit and vegetables) and import calendars (fresh fruit 
and vegetables). The EU enjoys preferential treatment on 33% of its exports to Turkey, with lower to 
zero TRQs for several products (cattle, frozen meat, dairy products, bulbs and plants, fruit, cereals, 
vegetable oil, sugar and tomato purée). 
5.5.2 Israel 
Signed in 1995, the EMAA became fully operational in June 2000, substituting the cooperation 
agreement made in 1975 and revising the free trade agreement for industrial products, in force since 
1989. The main differential features of Israel’s Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, when 
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compared with other agreements, concern non-agricultural matters such as industrial trade, trade 
marks, capital mobility, scientific and technological cooperation. 
Some improvements in the liberalisation of agricultural trade offer Israel concessions mainly on 
Mediterranean goods, including the application of a preferential entry price for oranges, the widening 
of TRQs on cut flowers and orange juice, a more favourable import calendar for table grapes and the 
opening of a new TRQ for turkey meat. Minor concessions are envisaged for many other products, 
nearly all involving the setting of the ad valorem tariff to zero, although the structure of quantitative 
restraints and the calendar suggests a certain amount of caution on the part of the EU. On the other 
side, the results have eased access to Israeli markets for EU cheese, beef, potatoes and certain types of 
prepared fruit; meanwhile a voluntary limitation on Israeli exports of maze and goose liver has also 
been obtained. The TRQs obtained for cereals and powdered milk are also significant. 
The activation of the new agreement was followed by a request by the Commission for a mandate to 
open negotiations for the revision of agricultural protocols. The new round of negotiations is still 
ongoing and should focus on further reciprocal tariff reductions, as well as further increases of TRQs 
on citrus juices and slight enlargements of the calendars for Israeli imports. 
5.5.3 Morocco 
The EMAA signed in 1996 became fully operational in March 2000, substituting the cooperation 
agreement made in 1976. The new deal envisages the creation of an FTA to be set up over a twelve-
year period through a progressive dismantling of customs duties on EU industrial products and gradual 
reciprocal concessions for agricultural products. 
In agricultural trade, the EMAA guarantees Morocco the setting to zero of ad valorem duties for 
nearly all products, albeit often within the framework of quotas, and effective or potential RQs. 
Calendars impose temporal restrictions on fresh fruit and vegetables. Foremost among the fresh or 
processed fruit, vegetables and citrus (representing the main body of the agreement) are: oranges and 
other fresh citrus, tomatoes, potatoes, cucumbers, beans, strawberries, dried apricots and orange juice. 
Imports of oranges, clementines, tomatoes, cucumbers, courgettes and artichokes are also helped by 
concessions on the entry price system for these products, but here too there are quantitative and 
calendar restrictions. Overall, the EU has maintained a rather cautious approach in its dealings with a 
trading partner that is directly competing with EU-grown Mediterranean produce. 
As with other countries, the EMAA with Morocco offers the EU a number of favourable concessions, 
such as TRQs for many staple foodstuffs and processed products – products that often exceed EU 
internal market absorption. The most important of these are cereals, dairy products, oils and fats, sugar 
and seed potatoes. Moreover, Morocco has committed itself to applying further reductions on customs 
duties for products where quotas are not completely filled. 
The application of the agreement was followed by a request from the Commission for a negotiating 
mandate for a widening of agricultural concessions. The new round of negotiations is still underway 
and should focus on refinements of the system to manage the TRQs on tomatoes and also further 
reciprocal tariff reductions and increases of TRQs. 
5.5.4 Tunisia 
The EMAA signed in 1995 became fully operational in March 1998, substituting the old cooperation 
agreement made in 1976. The new deal envisages the creation of an FTA, to be set up through a 
progressive dismantling, over twelve years, of Tunisian customs duties on industrial goods from the 
EU and the gradual introduction of reciprocal concessions for agricultural goods. 
From the Tunisian point of view, the main beneficiary is olive oil: the 2000 renegotiation of the 
agricultural protocols of the EMAA brought the current duty-free quota to 53,000 tonnes. Each year 
the TRQ is gradually increasing (1500 tonnes yearly) to reach 56,000 tonnes by January 2005. 
Following this increase, the Commission tightened the procedures for management of the TRQ on 
olive oil and broken it into monthly sub-quotas. The other important products are fresh and slightly 
processed fruit and vegetables (especially dates, fresh oranges, early potatoes, apricot pulp and tomato 
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purée), wine and a wide range of minor products. Quantitative restrictions are frequently applied, 
although recourse to TRQs is relatively minor. This would suggest that the main worry for the EU is 
Tunisian olive oil.  
Among the major novelties of this EMAA is the introduction of agricultural preferences in favour of 
the EU. Ad valorem duties are set to zero or reduced for many products, which are mainly staple foods 
(live animals, beef and poultry, dairy products, cereals, seed oil, sugar, potatoes and tobacco). For all 
of these products preferences are subject to TRQs. 
5.5.5 Algeria 
The negotiations on the EMAA to substitute the 1976 agreement were concluded in December 2001 
and the signing took place in 2002. Its structure is similar to other EMAAs and the main purpose is to 
create a free-trade area within a twelve-year time span. Once it is implemented, the new agreement 
will significantly broaden the current trading preferences. At the moment, tariff exemptions or 
reductions – unilaterally favouring Algeria – derived from the old 1976 agreement and later the 1987-
1988 revisions of the protocols are applied on a certain number of products, including fruit and 
vegetable products, dates, oranges and all qualities of wine. The only TRQ is on wine. 
Because of the EMAA, Algeria will introduce concessions favouring the EU, progressively 
eliminating obstacles to imports of industrial goods from the EU and applying preferential customs 
duties on imports of a number of agricultural products, such as cattle, beef, milk in powder, seed 
potatoes, cereals, oilseeds and sugar. For its part, the EU will grant zero tariff to imports of a wide 
range of agricultural products (live animals, fruit and vegetable products; citrus fruits; potatoes; olives; 
dates; olive oil; processed fruit, vegetable and citrus products, and wine), with widely unrestricted 
access apart from a limited number of products, which will be subject to TRQs.  
5.5.6 Egypt 
An EMAA was finally reached in June 2001 and the process of ratification is still ongoing. The new 
agreement will probably be implemented over the next year (by either speeding up the ratification 
procedure or adopting an interim agreement on trade), substituting the 1977 cooperation agreement 
that laid down rather limited concessions in favour of Egypt. The FTA is to be set up through the 
progressive dismantling of customs duties on industrial products coming from the EU and bilateral 
concessions are also envisaged for agriculture.  
On the Egyptian side, certain fruit and vegetables, as well as cut flowers, will benefit the most from 
the new EMAA, including: oranges (which already enjoy an entry price reduction), string beans, new 
potatoes and strawberries. There will not be any new concessions for rice. Considerable increases in 
quotas with tariff exemptions have been introduced to meet Egypt’s requests. These have been made, 
not on the basis of current trade flows, but with a view to their potential development. EU products 
benefiting from import TRQs include cheese, creamy products and animal fodder. 
6. An assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
6.1 Introduction 
Sections 2 through 5 have provided a general background of the MPCs’ trade flows with the EU and 
the EMAAs. The negotiations on the EMAAs have generated a stream of studies on their effect on the 
EU and especially on MPCs. This section aims to summarise the findings of this literature, against the 
backdrop of the information provided in the previous sections. Section 7 will combine the different 
parts of this study to indicate areas in which future research could contribute to a further understanding 
of the impact of the EMAAs. 
An assessment of the impact of the EMAAs can be approached from a wide variety of angles. To 
structure the discussion, the framework provided in section 2 is used, dividing this section into 13 
topics: security, cross-border projects, policy lock-in, producer interests, economies of scale, reduced 
monopoly power, increased efficiency, changes in the terms of trade, increased FDI, trade creation, 
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trade diversion, agglomeration and knowledge flows. As differences in the length of the discussion of 
these topics indicate, research has concentrated on certain subjects. 
6.2 Security 
Security issues feature prominently in the EMAAs. Of the three major chapters on intervention, two of 
these deal with security issues. The first chapter is about a political and security partnership, aiming at 
stabilising the region and promoting democracy. The social, cultural and human affairs partnership 
includes cooperation to deal with immigration and international crime. The Barcelona process also 
features in the recently launched proposal for a European security strategy (Solana, 2003), stressing 
the importance of political stability and economic growth at the southern borders of the EU.  
In terms of the security issues discussed in section 2, the EMAAs address the security through 
increased economic growth and intra-regional security through linking the MPCs. Promoting 
economic growth serves the security interests of both the EU and the MPCs. 
From the EU perspective, increasing the standard of living in the MPCs is deemed essential for 
preventing political conflicts, with its associated risk of large-scale economic migration to the EU. 
Limiting migration has become a more prominent policy concern with the substantial unemployment 
in southern European member countries and an increase in extreme right political parties all over 
Europe. Integrating the small Mediterranean economies into the EU economy is expected to promote 
their economic growth (Riess et al., 2001).  
The promotion of trade to reduce migration pressure assumes that trade and migration are substitutes. 
Theoretical literature on migration, however, indicates that trade and migration can be complements as 
well as substitutes, depending on the specific modelling assumptions. The link between trade and 
migration is therefore ambiguous. The wide variety of (partly unobservable) variables involved, makes 
empirical estimation complicated. The correlation of crude measures of migration to trade does not 
indicate a relationship between MPC-EU migration and trade (Nassar and Ghoneim, 2002). 
Apart from being a desirable objective itself, the MPCs have an interest in increased economic growth 
to deal with internal conflicts. Economic growth makes it easier to increase overall income levels in 
the economy; distributing new income is easier than redistributing existing income. Furthermore, their 
fast growing populations imply an equally fast growth in demand for new jobs, requiring an increased 
economic growth to prevent social unrest. 
Whether the interests of the EU and the MPCs in economic growth can be served through trade 
liberalisation seems questionable since the poor growth record of MPCs is largely home-grown. The 
interplay of non-trade income, high protection and state interference has led to lagging economic 
growth in the past decades. The reduction of trade barriers with the EU reduces protection, thus 
targeting only one out of three main factors dragging growth. Given the interplay between the different 
factors, the impact of the EMAAs on economic growth will be limited, if it is not accompanied by 
more structural changes in the MPCs’ economies. This is reflected by the limited static welfare gains 
estimated with computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (Stern, 2001). 
Recognising the important role of tariff revenues in MPC government budgets, the EU is supplying 
funds to deal with the short-term adjustment costs of the reforms. In the 2000-2006 period, these funds 
have been provided through the MEDA programme (5.5 billion euros) and through the European 
Investment Bank (7.5 billion euros). Together this amounts to about a half percent of the total MPC 
GDP (Riess et al., 2001:74). These funds further signal the interest the EU has in promoting economic 
growth in the region. Whether the funds will be effective remains to be seen; disbursement rates have 
been low until now (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002). 
Although the supply of funds by the EU signals its interest in the MPC region, in practice domestic 
interests seem to outweigh this foreign policy objective. As will be discussed in more detail in the 
section on producer interests, the actual scope of the EMAAs is limited to liberalising trade in 
manufactured products. The MPCs have already had preferential access to European Union markets 
since the 1970s. Thus, the impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements is limited to 
opening the MPC markets to European Union exports of manufactured goods.  
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The two pillars of most MPC economies – agriculture and (temporary) migration – are both excluded 
from the EMAAs. The liberalisation negotiated in GATT or GATS will be extended to the MPCs, 
which is not surprising given the MFN nature of WTO negotiations. The EMAAs, however, do not 
offer the MPCs preferential access to the EU for their agricultural products. The virtual absence of 
agricultural liberalisations in the EMAAs limits the scope for reducing poverty, which is concentrated 
in the rural areas (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:403). The lack of provisions on the movement of 
natural persons ignores another important way of reducing poverty and providing badly needed 
employment.  
A second security objective of the EMAAs is to reduce external conflicts, of which the region has a 
longstanding tradition. This is not directly achieved by the EMAAs since these are limited to 
liberalising trade with the EU. Promotion of intra-regional trade, however, may be encouraged by the 
EMAAs. The resulting outward orientation will make it easier to agree on regional trade liberalisation. 
A note of caution is advisable about the possibility of agglomeration if regional trade is liberalised (see 
below). An unequal distribution of benefits, for example a relocation of manufacturing to a single 
country, may actually increase regional tensions.  
In summary, increased market access resulting from the EMAAs will not suffice to increase economic 
growth. Domestic policies have to be geared towards exploiting the opportunities of increased trade, 
and to dealing with the short-term transition costs of a fundamental reorientation of the economy 
(Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:404). Apart from the domestic causes of the lagging economic growth, 
the scope of the EMAAs is limited to liberalising trade in manufactured products, excluding the two 
pillars of MPC economies, agricultural and (temporary) migration. 
6.3 Cross-border projects 
Literature on the impact of the EMAAs or the prospects for intra-regional integration does not refer to 
cross-border projects. The increased scarcity of water, possibly worsened if horticultural production 
expands, may increase regional conflicts on water and the scope for cross-border projects on water.  
Cross-border projects can also play a role in promoting economic growth through ‘growth-triangles’. 
Such arrangements facilitate sub-regional economic cooperation among complementary factors that 
are geographically close but in different countries. By eliminating border restrictions and charges in 
these areas, vibrant economic zones can be created. Examples include the collaborations between 
Taiwan and China, industrial development along the US-Mexican border, and activities in the border 
region of Germany, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
The key element of successful economic zones is the large disparity in comparative advantage within a 
small geographical area. In the context of the MPCs, there is potential for such a cross-border initiative 
between Israel (capital-rich and having relatively high technology) and its Arab neighbours (rich in 
labour, energy and land). Despite the economic rationale of such cooperation, the current political 
situation seems prevent to it. Nevertheless, political tensions in other growth triangles, such as 
Taiwan-China, measure up to those in the Middle East, so there may still be scope for such initiatives 
in the Middle East (Petri, 1997:50).  
6.4 Policy lock-in 
As mentioned before, the reforms needed to increase economic growth rates in the MPCs are about as 
badly needed as they are difficult to achieve. Reducing the size of the public sector involves a 
fundamental change in the distribution of state resources, with high political and adjustments costs. 
Public lay-offs have therefore been rare (Bulmer, 2000).  
The EMAAs signal the willingness of governments to engage in these adjustments. Given current high 
protection rates, the establishment of an FTA with the EU implies a large loss in tariff income. A 
reduction in government expenditures (and thus a decrease in the size of the public sector) will be 
required. By committing to a more liberal trade policy the MPC governments thus lock-in a public 
sector reform, which may not be achievable without the agreements.  
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The extent of trade liberalisation in the EMAAs determines the extent to which governments are able 
to lock-in the further reform of their economies. The limited scope of the current agreements also 
reduces the scope for reforms of MPC economies. Extending trade liberalisation to agriculture can 
play an important role in achieving a shift to a more outward-oriented policy in the MPCs. The 
comparative advantage of MPC agriculture can generate benefits that may compensate for the costs of 
transitions in the less competitive manufacturing sectors (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:403). 
Despite the qualifications with respect to the scope of the agreements, the major benefit of the EMAAs 
for the MPCs is the tilt of the political balance towards a more open orientation of their economies, 
which is hard to achieve by the MPCs themselves. Benefits from the EMAAs may provide an 
incentive to extend the reforms to sectors not included in the EMAAs (Petri, 1997:46).  
6.5 Producer interests 
Producer interests play an important a role in the pace and scope of trade liberalisation. The prime 
example is the virtual absence of agricultural liberalisation from the EMAAs, despite the crucial role 
of agriculture in the MPC economies. The importance of agricultural producer interests is illustrated 
by the fact that the ratification of most EMAAs has been delayed by objections against agricultural 
provisions (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:400). 
The interests of producers in liberalisation depend on their comparative advantage. European 
manufacturers have an interest in the scheduled liberalisation of the trade in manufactured goods, 
being more competitive than the MPC producers that are still shielded by tariffs. The MPC producers 
have an interest in stalling reforms of the manufacturing sector, which can be illustrated by the case of 
Tunisia.  
Tunisia is ahead of the other MPCs in reforming its economy and was the first MPC to sign an 
EMAA. After a crisis in the mid-1980s, reforms transformed Tunisia into a market-based economy. 
Macroeconomic stability (reached by fiscal discipline, low inflation and exchange-rate stability) 
played a key role in this transformation. Trade has diversified with increasing exports of manufactured 
goods and recently FDI has been increasing as well. Tunisia thus has implemented a range of major 
reforms, except for an abolishment of trade barriers. If the liberalisation of manufactured goods was 
implemented overnight, one-third of the industrial firms would become bankrupt. An adjustment 
programme therefore has been implemented to prepare firms for the competition of free trade. The 
success of this programme is limited and there is an increasing pressure on the government to push-
back the deadline of 2008 for full liberalisation (Riess et al., 2001:69-70). 
EU and MPC producers change positions when moving from the manufacturing to the agricultural 
sector. Here EU producers push for protection of Mediterranean products (‘sensitive’ products), and 
MPC producers push for protection of staple foodstuffs (‘strategic’ products), which is reflected in the 
pattern of exceptions to agricultural liberalisation. Although static gains may be limited, the dynamic 
gains of liberalisation after a period of five years are considerable for MPCs: 1.4% of GDP for 
Morocco, 2.3% for Turkey, 3.3% for Egypt and 0.4% for Tunisia. The impact for the EU is limited, 
with a projected increase in sensitive imports of 11% (Lorca and Vicens, 2001).  
In line with the limited projected impact on the EU, the European Commission does not consider 
Mediterranean imports a threat to European agriculture. Objections by farmers’ interest groups against 
the liberalisation of agricultural trade are based on fears of job losses and local interests. Although 
MPCs have lower labour costs, competitiveness in horticultural production is also determined by 
product differentiation, marketing, (post-harvest) technologies and transport, as is illustrated by the 
Dutch share in horticultural trade. The opening of trade is therefore not expected to lead to widespread 
job losses. Even if production shifts to the MPCs, the crop areas in EU countries can be reallocated to 
other productive uses (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:410-411) . 
Although the overall impact of trade liberalisation on the EU will be limited, the regional impact on 
southern EU countries may still be significant. Apart from local concerns, the asymmetric protection 
offered by the CAP (limited protection for horticultural products mainly produced in the south and 
extensive protection for cereals mainly produced in the north) reduces the willingness of southern EU 
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members to liberalise agricultural trade with the MPCs. They are joined by Dutch, German and 
Belgian producers pushing for limits on imports of Moroccan and Egyptian cut flowers, tomatoes and 
potatoes. Since the imports into the MPCs are mainly northern European products, while exporting 
commodities compete with southern European products, there seems little scope for reciprocal 
reductions in protection by MPCs and the EU (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:411-413). 
Quality standards may be used as NTBs, if applied in favour of domestic producers. Egypt, Israel and 
Tunisia (and Lebanon to a limited extent) apply quality measures that discriminate against foreign 
products. Morocco, Algeria and Jordan follow international criteria that do not discriminate among 
local and foreign products. A survey among importers and exporters indicated that the main NTBs 
hampering trade in the Mediterranean are port and transport services, together with long and unclear 
(and sometimes arbitrary) custom clearing (Handoussa and Reiffers, 2002:6-7).  
The most promising road to dealing with the southern EU opposition to the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade seems to be the upcoming eastward expansion of the EU with the Eastern European 
accession countries. This increases the market for horticultural products and could reduce the impact 
of liberalising Mediterranean trade on the southern producers (again, it is easier to redistribute 
additional income than to redistribute fixed income). Issues that require additional research are the 
local effects of liberalisation and the effects on agriculture-related manufacturing when investments 
relocate to MPCs (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:413-415).  
To summarise, even with limited liberalisation of agricultural trade, the EMAAs offer substantial, 
dynamic welfare gains for the MPCs. These gains, however, are preceded by a large shock to the 
manufacturing sector and depend strongly on the impact of improved market access and productivity 
increases (Augier and Gasiorek, 2001:29-30).  
6.6 Economies of scale 
Access to a larger market allows producers to benefit from economies of scale. Such economies of 
scale mainly occur in manufacturing, being of limited importance in agriculture. The EU abolished its 
trade barriers for manufactured products from the MPCs with the first cooperation agreements in the 
1960s and 1970s. Gains from economies of scale owing to the EMAAs can thus only be expected for 
EU producers. At first sight this gain seems limited given the small size of MPC economies. 
Nevertheless, because of the hub-and-spoke structure of the EMAAs, EU manufacturers have 
unrestricted access to all of the MPCs, while the MPC manufacturers continue to face trade barriers 
with other MPC countries. This gives EU producers an edge on MPC competitors.  
Tariffs form only part of the trade barriers among countries. Harmonisation and mutual recognition of 
standards as envisaged in the EMAAs will reduce uncertainty and transaction costs for both MPC and 
EU manufacturers. A deeper integration of EU and MPC markets can result in further gains from 
economies of scale. The distribution of the benefits of economies of scale between EU and MPC 
producers thus depends on the level of integration achieved by the EMAAs. Abolishment of MPC 
protection of manufactured goods benefits EU producers, while deeper integration will benefit both 
MPC and EU producers.  
The hub-and-spoke structure of the EMAAs plays a prominent role in the discussion of the distribution 
of economies of scale. If the MPCs establish an FTA among themselves, this would reduce the 
competitive advantage of EU producers located in the hub. In absolute terms, the current trade among 
MPCs is limited. In addition to trade barriers, the small size of the economies, similar production 
structures and vertical integration with the EU provide obvious reasons for this limitation. A more 
detailed look at the trade levels using trade intensity indexes (which control for size of trading 
partners) and gravity models suggest that the observed regional trade levels and patterns are in line 
with what can be expected given the endowments of the countries. Large increases in regional trade 
therefore seem unlikely (Petri, 1997).  
Despite these qualifications, further integration may still be desirable. Gravity models, being 
econometric models, are not well suited to address the impact of large structural changes, such as far-
reaching trade liberalisation. Attracting FDI by creating a larger market can be another incentive for 
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regional integration. Finally, analyses of intra-regional trade flows tend to focus on aggregate trade 
flows, ignoring possibilities for specialisation. 
Comparing intra-regional trade patterns to EU trade patterns indicates the presence of (limited) 
complementarities, which would allow for specialisation. As the development of the EU has shown, 
integration can foster specialisation and trade. Trade among the MPCs has been increasing lately, 
which could indicate the start of the dynamic effects of integration as observed in the EU (Handoussa 
and Reiffers, 2002:iii-iv). An interesting feature of the regional trade is the higher contribution of non-
traditional goods (processed agricultural goods, basic manufactured goods and intermediates) 
compared with trade with the EU and the rest of the world. The forward and backward linkages of 
these regionally traded goods can provide a basis for developing a more competitive manufacturing 
sector. Deeper integration among the MPCs could aid the diversification of exports and aid the 
transformation of the MPC economies by increasing research and development and learning-by-doing 
(Devlin and Page, 2001:212,221).  
Efforts at achieving regional integration have a bad track record. During the 1960s and 1970s, over 45 
bilateral treaties were concluded. The lack of time-tables and numerous exceptions have made these 
treaties largely ineffective. In 1997, a 1981-treaty was revived. A treaty to establish a Greater Arab 
Free Trade Area (GAFTA) was signed by 18 Arab states. Among these Arab countries, there are seven 
MPCs: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia (Devlin and Page, 
2001:191,228). Furthermore, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt negotiated the Agadir agreement in 
2003, also aiming at liberalising trade in the region.  
The commitments in the context of the GAFTA are more specific than in previous arrangements. With 
respect to its contents, it moves further than the EMAAs for agricultural commodities, while having 
fewer provisions on rules and standards. The commitment to liberalisation that MPCs have made by 
entering the EMAAs also makes it more likely that GAFTA will beat the bad track record of past 
regional integration efforts, providing an integrated regional market in which economies of scale can 
be achieved.  
6.7 Reduced monopoly power 
Reducing the protection of manufactured goods will increase competition and reduce the power of 
(state) monopolies. Furthermore, extending EU policies on competition to MPCs means that state 
monopolies and enterprises need to conform to EU laws. The EMAAs allow state-aid for 
disadvantaged regions, but no subsidies to compete for FDI with other MPCs (Zarrouk, 2001:250).  
The virtual lack of agricultural concessions in the EMAAs, however, implies that state monopolies in 
agriculture can maintain their position. This can hamper the development of the private sector, as the 
case of olive oil in Tunisia illustrates. The imports of olive oil to the EU from Tunisia are limited by 
(binding) quotas. These quotas are largely granted to a state enterprise, forcing private enterprises to 
export to less lucrative markets than the EU. Liberalising trade in olive oil would provide private 
enterprises with access to the EU markets, reducing the power of the state monopoly (Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia, 2001). 
6.8 Increased efficiency 
Studies of the impact of the EMAAs indicate limited static effects. The dynamic gains from increased 
efficiency owing to increased competition are therefore a main motivation for the agreements (Augier 
and Gasiorek, 2001:4). 
Despite a de facto limitation of the EMAAs to manufacturing, the scope for efficiency gains can still 
be expected to be large, given the current high tariffs that exceed 30% (Lahouel, 2001:95). Among the 
industrial sectors, protection in MPCs tends to be highest in the agro-food sector. The tariffs for the 
agro-food sector (ISIC 311:314), for example, are 31% in Egypt (1995), 26% in Jordan (2000), 48% 
Morocco (1995), and 36.4% in Tunisia (1995) (Augier and Gasiorek, 2001:9). Trade liberalisation, 
removing barriers against cheap imports, will have a strong impact on these sectors. Although 
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consumers can benefit immediately from cheaper European imports, the sector needs to go through a 
(painful) restructuring to become competitive with imported goods. 
6.9 Changes in the terms of trade 
A study of the terms of trade in the MPCs indicated that i) the volatility of the terms of trade has 
declined, ii) the terms of trade are improving, especially with the geographic region a country trades 
with most, and, iii) import prices have declined and export prices have improved (Handoussa and 
Reiffers, 2002:28).  
The decreased volatility of the terms of trade is related to an increased diversification of production 
from primary to labour-intensive manufactured goods. The improvement in terms of trade can largely 
be attributed to a decrease in import prices, reflecting the increasing competitive environment in the 
MPCs. Instances where export prices increased involved exports of high-tech goods produced by 
foreign firms (Handoussa and Reiffers, 2002:28-30).  
6.10 Increased FDI 
Attracting FDI is one of the most often mentioned reasons for entering a regional trade arrangement, 
as opposed to multilateral liberalisation. Expectations with regard to FDI where high when signing the 
EMAAs, but proved too optimistic. While FDI increased globally by 70% from 1992 to 1996, inflows 
to the MPCs decreased slightly. As a result, the MPCs’ share in FDI flowing to developing countries 
decreased from 2.1 to 1.2%. Although it can be argued that this period is too short to address the 
impact of the EMAAs, the poor record of the MPCs in attracting FDI does not offer much optimism 
for future developments (Lahouel, 2001:87-88). European investors moved from Eastern Europe to 
Latin America to benefit from MERCOSUR, ignoring the Mediterranean countries (Handoussa and 
Reiffers, 2002:ii). Three main reasons can be cited to explain the disappointing trend of FDI flows to 
the MPCs: limited agricultural liberalisation, postponement of negotiations on investment and the hub-
and-spoke nature of the EMAAs. 
Agriculture is the main sector for most MPCs. Excluding agriculture from the reciprocal concessions 
in the EMAAs thus reduces opportunities for increased FDI in the region (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 
2002:403). Similar to agriculture, negotiations on investment are postponed when signing the 
agreements. As a result, domestic polices unfavourable to foreign investors remain unaltered. In 
Tunisia, for example, foreign ownership is unrestricted only in manufacturing activities that export at 
least 80% of their output; Jordan restricts foreign ownership to less than 50% in certain sectors. 
Although there are changes in government attitudes towards private enterprises, there are still a large 
number of impediments to FDI: cumbersome custom clearance, inefficient commercial dispute 
settlement and the high costs of telecommunications (often still a public monopoly) (Lahouel, 
2001:92).  
The lack of commitments on investment is especially important for the service sector, which most 
often requires a local establishment. Services in their turn are important for competitiveness in the 
global economy. If there are no improvements in the legal and regulatory framework to promote both 
domestic and foreign investments, the increased competition from imports will not be balanced by 
investments, possibly leading to a significant negative impact of the EMAAs for the MPCs (Stern, 
2001:23). 
While the shallow nature of the EMAAs does not support the inflow of FDI, their hub-and-spoke 
character may have actually reduced the incentives for FDI. Tariff-jumping was an incentive for FDI 
before the EMAAs. With the EMAAs in place, but lacking regional integration, companies could 
relocate to the EU, and serve the MPCs from here. Economies of scale coupled with the small size of 
the individual MPC economies, reinforces such a reduction of FDI in favour of investments in the EU 
(Lahouel, 2001:102).  
The capacity to attract FDI therefore depends on the extent to which regional trade agreements manage 
to provide horizontal linkages among MPCs (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002:409). The hub-and-spoke 
structure of the EMAAs, however, promotes a similar development of production structures in MPCs. 
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This reduces the complementarity of MPC economies, which may partly account for the protectionism 
in the region and hampers south-south integration (Handoussa and Reiffers, 2002). 
If the MPCs should succeed in increasing their share of global FDI flows, the positive impact on their 
economies may still be limited. Empirical evidence suggests that the benefits from FDI, spill over 
effects and productivity growth mostly accrue from trade among advanced countries, as opposed to 
trade among advanced and developing countries (Stern, 2001:24-26).  
6.11 Trade creation and diversion 
Trade creation and diversion play a central role in the debate on preferential versus unilateral or 
multilateral liberalisation. Trade creation occurs by reducing trade restrictions. Given that the MPCs 
are one of the most protected regions, there is scope for trade creation (Handoussa and Reiffers, 
2002:4-5).  
Although the removal of trade restrictions is important, it may not be sufficient to increase the export 
of horticultural products by MPCs. Additional hurdles to increasing exports are high marketing costs 
(such as logistics, transport and post-harvest handling) and quality specifications (grades, packaging, 
environmental procedures and time of delivery). A limited number of retail holdings dominate the 
European food retail market, allowing them to impose quality standards. These standards cannot 
currently be met by all MPC producers, despite their comparative advantage in terms of climate and 
labour costs (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002). 
Trade diversion is not an issue for countries in which the EU is already the major trading partner or for 
MPCs that have preferential trade arrangements with other major trading partners (Israel, for example, 
has also signed an FTA with the US). Considering the geographical orientation of trade, Egypt, Jordan 
and Lebanon have the most diversified trade patterns, thus running the risk of trade diversion because 
of the EMAAs (Petri, 1997:46). 
Ex ante CGE modelling for Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt indicates that the costs of a possible trade 
diversion would be exceeded by dynamic welfare gains, especially if the EMAAs could result in the 
reduced administration costs of trade, a harmonisation of standards and export-related, dynamic 
productivity effects. Short-term (comparative static) gains from unilateral and multilateral 
liberalisation exceed the gains from the EMAAs. These results again underscore the importance of 
accounting for the dynamic aspects of the EMAAs (policy credibility, capital accumulation, FDI, 
industrial location, knowledge accumulation and spill overs) (Stern, 2001). 
6.12 Agglomeration 
The EMAAs are not implemented at the same time. Tunisia is often used in empirical analyses of the 
EMAAs, being the first country to sign an EMAA. The similarities in endowments and production 
structures, small economies and a different pace of implementing the EMAAs raise concerns about 
agglomeration effects.  
Although integration of the MPC economies may be crucial for attracting FDI, it can also lead to a 
concentration of benefits in a limited numbers of countries. Given the small size of the MPC 
economies, their markets could be served from a single location in one of the MPCs. If linkages exist 
between different industries this could lead to an inflow of FDI to a single country, which then serves 
as the regional ‘hub’. Certain countries may be a preferred location because they are at a further stage 
of liberalisation, have a better infrastructure or more supportive domestic policies. Such a development 
could increase tensions in the region since, while all countries face the adjustment costs of reducing 
tariffs on manufacture goods, only a few would enjoy the benefits of additional investments. 
In the literature used for this section no references were made to such agglomeration effects. A major 
problem is the lack of data, since a data for individual countries is required. There are CGE models of 
individual countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) and there is one model that has most of the 
MPCs separately included (a CGE model of industrial sectors developed by Augier and Gasiorek, 
2001). The model by Augier and Gasiorek could be used for a study of agglomeration since it accounts 
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for economies of scale (an important driving force of agglomeration). In their simulations, such effects 
are ignored; they assume that all MPCs implement the liberalisations at the same time.  
6.13 Knowledge flows 
The increasing in trade following implementation of the EMAAs could increase the flow of 
knowledge and stimulate domestic innovation. This knowledge-effect of trade, however, can be 
limited by the preferential nature of the liberalisations, if it leads to a diversion of trade from the US 
and Japan to the EU, as the US and Japan have the highest stocks of knowledge (Stern, 2001:27). 
An increase in trade in industrial products, as may be expected with the current liberalisation pattern, 
would promote a stronger flow of knowledge if production is relocated to the MPCs. This effect again 
argues in favour of achieving regional integration in order to attract FDI. 
The current export-composition from MPCs does not favour a build-up of knowledge. Their 
production and export focuses on primary production, while lagging in terms of manufacturing. The 
current trade pattern lacks the dynamism of comparable countries in terms of development level (Petri, 
1997:39). 
7. Conclusions and the identification of key issues for analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
This section summarises the findings of the preliminary assessment of the EMP and identifies key 
issues for further analytical work.  
The EMP represents an ambitious attempt to re-launch the EU’s role in the Mediterranean and it is 
broadly aimed at promoting political stability in the area by improving economic integration and 
increasing incomes. Section 7.2 assesses whether these ambitious aims can be met in the near future. 
Coherence of the EMAAs’ aims with the actual policies, especially in the treatment of agriculture, is 
an important issue in this respect.  
Section 7.3 provides an identification of the topics to be dealt with in order to deepen the analysis of 
EMAAs. Besides a number of specific options, there seems to be a more fundamental choice to be 
made between studying marginal changes in agriculture and broadening the scope to wider issues 
related to the development of MPC economies.  
7.2 Broad assessment of the EMP 
The main aim of the EMAAs is to spur economic growth in the MPCs, serving both EU and MPC 
security interests. Whether the EMAAs will succeed seems highly questionable, for four reasons:  
1) the poor growth record of the MPCs has largely domestic causes; 
2) the liberalisation in the EMAAs has a very limited scope; 
3) the hub-and-spoke structure of the Euro-Mediterranean RTA; and, 
4) contradictory EU policies, especially in agriculture. 
7.2.1 Poor growth record 
Given current levels of unemployment and population growth, increasing economic growth is vital for 
the MPCs. Their track record is, however, not promising, with growth lagging compared with 
countries that have similar endowments. Lagging economic growth in the MPCs is to a large extent a 
home-grown problem and can be attributed to the interplay of three factors: 
§ Biased sources of foreign exchange. Oil exports and remittances are important sources of foreign 
exchange for a number of countries. This distorts the economy towards non-traded sectors of the 
economy, reducing investments in the traded sector (the ‘Dutch Disease’). 
§ High protection levels. MPCs are among the most protected economies in the world, sheltering 
domestic firms from international competition. Combined with the focus on those non-traded 
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sectors that are induced by inflows of non-trade foreign exchange, this resulted in a production 
structure that is not internationally competitive. 
§ Strong state intervention. MPC governments play an active role through a dominant presence of 
state enterprises and an over-staffed public sector that employs a large part of the labour force.  
In summary, MPC economies have a highly protected production structure that is not internationally 
competitive, high government expenditures (partly financed by tariff revenues), high population 
growth and extensive unemployment. 
Liberalisation in the context of the EMAAs, (especially in the current limited form) only targets one of 
these causes – high protection rates. More fundamental changes will be needed to put economic 
growth in the MPCs back on track. The EMAAs may aid increased economic growth. To capture the 
potential gains, effective domestic policy changes are needed, as well as complementary measures in a 
multilateral trade-setting. 
7.2.2 Limited scope of liberalisation 
Despite the broad intentions voiced in the Barcelona Declaration, the trading component of EMAAs 
provides for a liberalisation of trade in manufactured products by the MPCs in exchange for financial 
support through the MEDA programme and the European Investment Bank. These funds are meant to 
cover part of the adjustment costs of the highly protected MPC economies (actual disbursement of the 
funds is limited to 25% of the commitments). 
Agriculture plays an important role in most countries, in terms of contributing to GDP as well as a 
source of employment. A more outward orientation of the economies may contribute to an increase in 
economic growth, but will require major changes in government spending and in production 
structures. Adjustment costs are high and may exceed the benefits of liberalisation in the short term. 
Paradoxically, the distinguishing feature of the EMAAs – which is their reciprocal nature – allows the 
EU to ask MPCs to open their (highly protected) manufacturing markets, while keeping the MPCs’ 
agricultural and other ‘sensitive’ products out of its own market. In fact, for industrial products the EU 
market has already been largely open since the agreements of the 1970s, while agriculture and a few 
other labour intensive production sectors are treated as ‘exceptions’. 
The agreements do not include specific timetables for liberalising agriculture, investments or services. 
Liberalisation for these sectors is de facto out of reach in the near future. With respect to agriculture, 
the general consensus is that the EU is not granting any noteworthy new concessions. With respect to 
investments, most MPCs restrict foreign investments and seem reluctant to liberalise. As for services, 
the current political landscape in Europe does not seem to favour liberalisation, which may involve 
(temporary) migration. 
In summary, the EMAAs are asymmetric owing to the postponement of negotiations on difficult issues 
such as agriculture, investment, and migration. Short-term effects on MPCs are limited and can even 
be negative, reducing the incentives for continuing liberalisation. Long-term gains could be significant 
if MPC economies are able to adjust to the increased competition.  
7.2.3 The hub-and-spoke structure of the Euro-Mediterranean RTA 
The EMAAs are bilateral agreements between the EU and individual MPCs, and do not include 
provisions for agreements among MPCs. In practice, the EMAAs result in a hub-and-spoke RTA 
mainly benefiting the EU, and are still far from achieving the deep integration envisioned in the 
Barcelona Declaration. 
In order to create a Mediterranean free-trade area the MPCs will need to negotiate bilateral agreements 
among themselves. The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) seems a potential structure for 
arriving at such an expanded free-trade area. Among the Arab countries that signed GAFTA are seven 
MPCs: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia. The Agadir agreement is 
another step towards regional integration. 
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Intra-regional trade levels are currently low in absolute terms. Whether they will increase if a 
Mediterranean free-trade area is established remains an open question. Econometric models based on 
gravity equations suggest that regional trade flows are at their ‘appropriate’ level. If a Mediterranean 
FTA balances the current strong orientation towards the EU, there may be scope for increased 
specialisation and trade.  
A Mediterranean FTA is also necessary to compete with other FTAs (especially MERCOSUR) in 
attracting FDI. FDI flows to the MPCs are low and decreasing. In the absence of a Mediterranean 
FTA, the EMAAs may actually further decrease FDI. With the EMAAs in place, but lacking regional 
integration, companies can relocate to the EU and serve all of the MPCs from there. The economies of 
scale, coupled with the small size of the individual MPC economies, reinforce such a reduction of FDI 
in favour of investments in the EU.  
7.2.4 Contradictory EU policies, especially in agriculture 
As a whole, the treatment of agricultural trade appears to fall short of the liberalising project of the 
EMP and there are some contradictions between the objectives and policy instruments that the 
negotiating parties have agreed upon.  
The MPCs are going to face problems with the prospect of opening up their economies, such as a fall 
in tariff revenues, international competition, sector adjustments and asymmetry in the pace of trading 
reform between agricultural sectors, as well as between the agricultural sectors as a whole when 
compared with other sectors.  
On EU side, the de facto approach is in contrast with the set-up of an EMP technical and financial 
cooperation aimed at re-launching MPC agriculture. While MPCs are helped to rebuild their 
agricultural policies and improve their trade performance, EU agricultural markets remain 
substantially locked in the traditional protectionist framework. In addition, such an approach of 
protecting agriculture is in contrast with the prevailing EU member policies on immigration, since 
containing MPC agricultural growth compromises job creation in MPC agriculture and encourages 
migration.  
In summary, despite an understanding of the links between trade liberalisation and other policies 
aimed at developing and integrating in the Mediterranean basin, actual trading preferences are not 
consistent with (and often conflict with) a number of other policy dimensions relevant to the EMP 
objectives. 
Besides these policy contradictions within the EMP, the EU’s treatment of trade in the agricultural 
chapter of the current Mediterranean agreements shows two main shortfalls: 
§ the difficulty of pushing through sufficient trade concessions to effectively support the 
strengthening of the EU’s role in the Mediterranean; 
§ the weakness of the current protectionist framework for the purpose of supporting Mediterranean 
EU producers. While on EU fresh product markets (i.e. fruit and vegetables) non-price factors are 
becoming increasingly important for successful marketing, inward-looking trade policies keep 
dealing mainly with the cost and price factors of competitive advantage. In the long run, the lack 
of suitable structural policies – which deal with marketing systems, quality, and technologies for 
product management and delivery – may eventually displace many EU producers as the leading 
trade companies and operators (usually European as well), no matter the level of border protection. 
7.3 Key issues for future analysis 
As has been mentioned in section 6, there is a significant amount of research on the impact of the 
EMAAs on the MPCs and on the EU and its member countries. Based on the literature used for this 
study, a number of issues can be identified that seem relevant but are not covered by existing studies.  
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Non-tariff barriers 
Liberalising trade may not be sufficient to offer MPCs access to European markets. Especially in 
horticultural markets a limited number of retailers pose demands (on grades, packaging, environmental 
conditions, certification and so on) that may not be met by MPC producers. Despite a comparative 
advantage in terms of labour costs and climate, some countries may not be able to gain access to EU 
markets, even if they become liberalised. Additional research on the structure of the EU market and 
the extent to which MPCs can meet its requirements could help in making the EMAAs more effective. 
Trade barriers at the MPC side 
The current study, as most studies on the EMP, is biased towards the (agricultural) trade barriers of the 
EU. The trade barriers erected by the MPCs have not been discussed in detail, mainly since limited 
information is available. In order to understand the scope for liberalisation, as well as its impact, a 
more detailed understanding of the protection on the MPC side (tariffs, non-tariff barriers and 
subsidies) would be useful. Apart from analysing specific trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas in 
more detail, the impact of lengthy and uncertain custom procedures seems to strongly affect trade in 
the region. This affects both EU exporters and those MPC producers willing to export.  
Distribution of benefits among MPCs 
Differences in the pace of signing and implementing the EMAAs and in the institutional and structural 
features of MPCs will result in an uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of the liberalisations. 
This effect will be stronger if a Mediterranean FTA is negotiated. The agglomeration of activities in a 
few countries may actually increase tensions in the region. Existing studies focus on a single country 
or assume that the agreements are implemented simultaneously in all countries.  
Linking the eastward and southward expansion of the EU 
The interests of producers in southern EU states play an important role in the virtual absence of 
agricultural concessions in the EMAAs. The eastward expansion of the EU may offer a window of 
opportunity for opening EU agricultural markets. The expansion of the markets will reduce the 
negative impact of the liberalisation (dividing additional income is easier than redistributing current 
income) and make it more palatable to southern EU producers. 
Local effects on EU countries 
Most studies indicate a limited aggregate impact of the EMAAs on the EU, even with full 
liberalisation. Local effects on specific regions, especially in the southern EU states can be significant. 
Estimates of these local effects seem to be missing in existing studies.  
Cross-border initiatives 
The establishment of ‘growth triangles’ that combine the different factor endowments of neighbouring 
countries may be an interesting option, from an economic as well as a political point of view. The 
large differences in the 
The resource endowments between Israel and its Arab neighbours seem promising for increasing the 
stability in the region. Research into the possibility and feasibility of such triangles could offer an 
alternative option for achieving (partly) the aims of the Barcelona Process.  
Finally, it is notable that the direction of future research within ENARPRI seems to be the (non-
exclusive) choice between studying marginal changes in agriculture (which could still have large local 
effects in particular regions in the EU and the MPCs) and broadening the scope to more general trade 
and development issues (such as the direct and indirect effects of opening the manufacturing markets 
in MPCs). 
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